Pricing Intelligence: Task-Based Learning and Labor Displacement in the AI Economy*

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Abstract

What determines the speed of AI-driven labor displacement? I study this question in a microeconomic model in which firms choose between labor and AI to complete tasks. AI models improve through task-specific learning from deployment. Profit-maximizing AI providers price tasks where labor has a strong comparative advantage out of automation to extract more revenue from other tasks, which decelerates total AI adoption by preventing AI learning on the excluded tasks. I characterize when this tension gives rise to an accelerating path of AI adoption or a learning trap in which adoption remains persistently low. Competition shifts AI deployment and learning toward tasks where AI has a comparative disadvantage and, if it is sufficiently intense, accelerates AI adoption. Asymmetric competition can further accelerate AI adoption by inducing providers to specialize. Importantly, even temporary regulatory interventions such as constraints on providers' compute capacities can keep AI adoption persistently low.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Task-Based Learning, Labor Displacement, Pricing, Competition.

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1 Introduction

Rapid improvements in artificial intelligence (AI) are transforming economies around the world, with far-reaching consequences for the future of work. Recent estimates suggest that up to 25% of all tasks in the US economy could be automated in the next decade (Goldman Sachs, 2026). The speed and magnitude of these developments give rise to the following pressing questions: What determines the nature of technological progress in AI and the resulting labor displacement? How can policymakers influence these dynamics?

This paper analyzes these questions from a microeconomic perspective, focusing on the role of AI providers' market power and competition between them. Which tasks are automated at any point in time depends on AI's comparative advantages relative to labor and on the prices strategically set by AI providers. Importantly, these determinants are dynamically linked due to a central feature of AI markets: users are not only customers of AI services but also sources of task-specific learning. When users complete certain tasks using AI, the AI system improves at completing these tasks (Anthropic, 2025; OpenAI, 2026).[1] Further, when AI takes over a category of tasks, workers have fewer opportunities to acquire and maintain the necessary skills, which raises the future cost of completing these tasks using labor.[2] By influencing which tasks are automated, AI providers' pricing decisions thus shape how AI's comparative advantages evolve and, ultimately, how quickly labor is displaced.

I establish three main results. First, AI adoption can undergo a convex takeoff, with slow initial growth followed by rapid acceleration, or enter a learning trap in which adoption remains persistently low. The reason is that profit-maximizing AI providers optimally price tasks where labor has a strong comparative advantage out of automation to extract more revenue from other tasks, thereby preventing AI learning on the excluded tasks. Changes in the magnitude of AI's comparative advantage can therefore be self-reinforcing: in particular, a shrinking comparative advantage generates a convex takeoff. Second, symmetric competition accelerates AI adoption relative to monopoly, i.e., raises the speed at which AI adoption increases, if it is intense enough. Although competition reduces the total amount of learning data available to each provider, it lowers the price of AI and thus shifts AI learning toward tasks where it has a comparative disadvantage. Third, asymmetric competition can further accelerate AI adoption by inducing providers to specialize, which concentrates the availability of data on tasks where AI has a comparative disadvantage.

[1] Anthropic explicitly notes that "when a developer debugs code by collaborating with an AI model, that interaction offers valuable signals that help improve future models on similar coding tasks" (Anthropic, 2025). OpenAI runs business data submitted to its services through automated classifiers and can use the resulting metadata, which do not contain any protected data, for analysis (OpenAI, 2026).

[2] A large literature in labor economics establishes that learning-by-doing is quantitatively central to the formation of human capital (Dustmann & Meghir, 2005; Burdett et al., 2020; Dinerstein et al., 2022).

I begin by considering a dynamic monopoly model in which AI adoption directly translates into labor displacement. In every period, a mass of firms—hereafter, users—must complete a continuum of tasks. A profit-maximizing AI provider sets a per-task price for AI access, and each user decides, for each of its tasks, whether to complete it by hiring labor or by purchasing AI. When a user purchases AI to complete a task, the AI may fail to complete it successfully. I distinguish two categories of tasks based on the initial pattern of comparative advantage: *established tasks*, where AI initially has the comparative advantage over labor, and *frontier tasks*, where labor has the comparative advantage. This pattern of comparative advantage means that users have a lower willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks than for established tasks. Importantly, the AI's capabilities evolve through task-specific learning: when users utilize AI to attempt tasks in a certain category, this improves its future ability to successfully complete such tasks. The key tension of the model is thus that serving frontier tasks accelerates future AI adoption by reducing AI's comparative disadvantage, but requires the provider to sacrifice current profits from established tasks.

This tension can generate a convex takeoff in AI adoption, with slow initial growth followed by rapid acceleration. When labor initially has a strong comparative advantage at frontier tasks, total AI adoption is low and grows slowly because automation—and hence task-specific learning—is concentrated on established tasks. If technological drift reduces AI's comparative disadvantage at frontier tasks, the provider eventually finds it optimal to set a price at which some frontier tasks are also automated. Then, AI begins to improve much faster at frontier tasks, which accelerates the automation of these tasks. Because the provider sets a relatively low price, AI adoption on established tasks also increases, which can further accelerate total adoption by promoting AI learning on these tasks.

Alternatively, the tension between profit maximization and frontier-task learning can generate a learning trap in which AI adoption remains persistently low. This can occur even if some tasks in both categories are initially automated. If the AI's ability to successfully complete established tasks increases relatively quickly, AI's comparative advantage at these tasks strengthens over time. The provider then optimally raises the AI price faster than users' willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks increases, which progressively reduces AI adoption on these tasks until it reaches zero. In the absence of technological drift, total AI adoption then remains persistently low because it is confined to established tasks.

After establishing these results, I analyze a model of symmetric competition between two AI providers that retains the other features of the monopoly benchmark. Competition has three countervailing effects on the speed at which total AI adoption increases. First, there is a data-fragmentation effect: under competition, each provider receives less total data than the monopolist in equilibrium, which slows learning and hence the growth in AI

adoption. Second, there is a learning pass-through effect: improvements in the capabilities of any provider's AI translate into smaller increases in the price set by this provider under competition. A given amount of AI learning therefore increases AI adoption more strongly under competition. Third, there is a data-composition effect: By lowering the price of AI, competition disproportionately expands AI deployment on frontier tasks and thereby increases the share of frontier-task data in providers' data pools. Frontier task learning is therefore relatively fast under competition, which can accelerate total AI adoption.

AI adoption thus increases faster under symmetric competition if competition is sufficiently intense. If competition is weak, both the learning pass-through effect and the data-composition effect are weak because the equilibrium price under competition is close to the equilibrium price in the monopoly benchmark. As a result, the data-fragmentation effect dominates and competition slows AI adoption. If competition is sufficiently strong, the learning pass-through effect is strong, so competition accelerates AI adoption. A higher efficiency of frontier-task learning strengthens the data-composition effect and thereby makes it more likely that AI adoption grows faster under competition.

Asymmetric competition between providers can further accelerate AI adoption if the value of frontier-task learning is sufficiently large. To demonstrate this, I consider a setting where one provider is initially better at established tasks, while the other is better at frontier tasks. These technological differences induce the providers to specialize: automated established tasks are predominantly served by the provider with the corresponding advantage, and vice versa. This has countervailing effects on the speed of AI adoption. Market segmentation raises the average price of AI by weakening competition, which reduces total AI adoption and slows AI learning. However, frontier-task data become concentrated at the provider specializing in these tasks, so its AI system improves at these tasks faster than under symmetric competition. If frontier-task learning is sufficiently valuable, asymmetric competition thus accelerates AI adoption because the learning effect dominates.

My results demonstrate that regulatory interventions can shape not only the economic effects of AI but also the trajectory of technological progress in AI itself. For example, implementing a temporary constraint on providers' compute capacity, e.g., by delaying the construction of data centers, can have persistent effects. A sufficiently tight compute constraint increases the equilibrium price of AI, which disproportionately reduces the automation of frontier tasks and therefore reinforces AI's comparative advantage at established tasks. This can keep AI adoption persistently low even after the compute constraint is lifted.

Related Literature: I contribute to the rapidly growing literature on the economic effects of AI by studying a model that combines (i) strategic pricing by AI providers and (ii)

task-specific learning by AI through usage. More broadly, the paper's contribution is to show how providers' strategic pricing incentives and competition between them affect the speed of AI-driven labor displacement by shaping the direction of technological progress in AI.

My paper builds on task-based models of technological change. Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018) study how automation and the creation of new labor-intensive tasks shape economic growth and factor shares. Aghion et al. (2017) and Jones & Liu (2024) consider how automation and productivity improvements in automated tasks determine growth. In contrast to these papers, technological progress in my model arises through task-specific learning from deployment: using AI on a particular task improves its future ability to perform that task.

Several papers study optimal pricing by AI providers. Bergemann et al. (2026) study menu pricing for large language models, and analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe affects outcomes.[3] Athey et al. (2026) study how AI providers' market power affects welfare by shaping the downstream adoption of AI.[4] Lehr & Restrepo (2026) study how socially minded AI providers optimally price and deploy AI when they care not only about profits, but also about welfare and labor-market disruption. In contrast to my work, AI capabilities are exogenous in all these papers, i.e., these papers do not consider the effect of providers' strategic pricing/access decisions on the speed and direction of AI learning.

My work is also related to the literature on production-based and consumption-based learning in product markets, following Cabral & Riordan (1994). Gurkan & de Véricourt (2022) study consumption-based learning under moral hazard. Hagiu & Wright (2023) integrate consumption-based learning that boosts future demand into a model of competition. Llanes & Madio (2024) study a similar model and pin down the optimal business model of a monopolist.[5] All these papers consider models in which learning does not depend on the composition of the customer base, whereas I study a model of task-based learning.

A growing body of work studies how automation shapes the evolution of human and AI capabilities. von Maydell (2024) and von Maydell & Firth (2025) consider models in which the rate at which AI improves depends on aggregate output and the total measure of tasks completed by AI. In Dong et al. (2026), AI learns from both real economic data and synthetic data generated by AI.[6] Because synthetic data are less valuable for learning than

[3]Zhong (2025) considers a model of screening based on urgency. Z. Zhang et al. (2025) analyze under what conditions AI is optimally deployed in the cloud. Lobel et al. (2026) study optimal AI-pricing if tasks vary in complexity. Peng et al. (2026) study a screening model in which the principal can learn the distribution of types over time. F. Zhang et al. (2026) study AI pricing if users can personalize their experience.

[4]Mahmood (2024) studies under what conditions competing AI providers specialize. Dasaratha et al. (2025) study competition between firms that sell prediction models.

[5]Gersbach et al. (2025) study a model in which AI learning depends positively on the output of an applied research sector. However, AI learning does not depend on AI deployment, so providers' pricing decisions do not shape future AI capabilities.

[6]Fudenberg & Koh (2026) study an innovation race in which AI firms choose when to stop the exogenous

real economic data, development traps and boom–bust cycles can emerge.[7] Chequer et al. (2026) study a macroeconomic model in which firms train AI on data generated by their workers. In contrast to my work, none of these papers models providers' strategic decisions or competition between them, and none features task-specific learning.

Althoff & Reichardt (2026) estimate a dynamic task-based model in which workers accumulate multidimensional skills on the job, but the share of tasks which are automated is exogenous. They establish that AI substantially increases the average wage while simultaneously reducing wage inequality. Asriyan et al. (2026) show that automating junior tasks can lower long-run output: by shifting earnings to later in workers' careers, it discourages entry into careers that require experience. In Asriyan et al. (2026), performing junior tasks is a prerequisite for performing senior tasks, rather than a source of improvement at the junior tasks themselves. Most importantly, neither Althoff & Reichardt (2026) nor Asriyan et al. (2026) model strategic AI providers. By contrast, the interaction between strategic AI pricing and task-based learning underlies all mechanisms and results in my paper.

Closest to my work is Farboodi et al. (2026), who study a task-based macroeconomic model in which the data that are generated when a task is performed improve AI's ability to automate that task. The authors derive tight conditions which determine whether the economy becomes partially or fully automated in the long run, and show that the equilibrium is generically inefficient. Importantly, however, Farboodi et al. (2026) do not consider strategic AI providers or competition between them. The resulting differences in the mechanisms which govern AI adoption also lead to distinct predictions regarding its evolution. For example, the long-run aggregate automation share is pinned down by structural parameters such as the substitutability of tasks in Farboodi et al. (2026). By contrast, AI adoption in my model can exhibit path dependence: in particular, changes in AI's initial capabilities or temporary policy interventions can have persistent effects on AI adoption.

2 Monopoly Benchmark

2.1 Model

Players and tasks: Time is discrete and indexed by t. In every period, a unit mass of firms—hereafter, users—must each complete a set of tasks, equal shares of which are established tasks (indexed E) and frontier tasks (indexed F). As formalized later, this task categorization

advancement of a risky technology. By contrast, I study competition in the market for AI services.

[7] Taitler & Ben-Porat (2025) show that an AI platform may optimally withhold responses to redirect users to human forums, where their activity generates high-quality data for future AI training. Ng & Wessel (2026) study the role of generative AI in synthesizing search results.

reflects the initial pattern of comparative advantages. The aggregate measure of tasks is 1. Successfully completing a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ yields the value $v_j > 0$ for a user.

An AI provider sells access to an AI model and, in each period, chooses the per-task price p_t which a user must pay when attempting to complete a task using the AI model.[8] Every user decides, for each of her tasks, whether to attempt to complete the task using AI or to complete the task using labor.[9] When a user hires labor to complete a task, it is completed successfully with probability one.[10] The associated costs which accrue to the user are $r_j \in (0, v_j)$, with $j \in \{E, F\}$. If a user purchases AI to complete a task, the AI may fail to complete it successfully. In that case, the user derives zero value from the task and cannot attempt to complete it again. I define $s_{j,t} \in [0, 1]$ as the probability that a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ is completed successfully when attempted by the AI model at time t.

Users' preferences: When a user chooses to complete a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ using labor, this yields the net value $v_j - r_j$. A user's willingness to pay for purchasing AI to attempt a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ in period t is thus

$$\underbrace{r_j - (1 - s_{j,t})v_j}_{:=V_{j,t}} - \kappa, \tag{1}$$

where $\kappa \sim U[0, 1]$ is an independently drawn task-specific cost of AI adoption borne by the user, and $V_{j,t}$ is the users' gross willingness to pay for purchasing AI to attempt a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$.

Comparative advantages: The categorization of tasks into established and frontier tasks reflects the initial pattern of comparative advantages. Established tasks are tasks where AI initially has the comparative advantage over labor, and frontier tasks are tasks where labor has the comparative advantage. Formally, this means that $V_{E,0} > V_{F,0} > 0$.

This pattern of comparative advantage can reflect that established tasks are less valuable (i.e., $v_E < v_F$), so that an AI failure is less costly on established tasks, or that the AI's success probability is higher on established tasks than frontier tasks (i.e., $s_{E,0} > s_{F,0}$). Importantly, the specification that both $V_{E,0}$ and $V_{F,0}$ are strictly positive captures the possibility that

[8] My results are robust to several alternative pricing schemes such as flat fees and token-based pricing, which I discuss in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

[9] My results also extend if the AI provider sells access to multiple models with varying quality. I formalize this in Section 4.3 by drawing on empirically established relationships between model qualities and the success probabilities at different task categories (Kwa et al., 2026).

[10] The model can readily be extended to allow for the possibility that labor fails to complete a task successfully. Define h_j as the probability that labor successfully completes a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$, and w_j as the wage users must pay when labor attempts the task. Defining $r_j = w_j + (1 - h_j)v_j$ as the effective cost of completing the task using labor, the net value of completing the task using labor is $v_j - r_j$. The remaining analysis proceeds equivalently.

AI already has the absolute advantage at all tasks from the start, i.e., that all users have a positive willingness to pay for automating each one of their tasks.

One possible interpretation of this categorization is that established tasks are standardized, well-defined activities within the capabilities of current AI models. Frontier tasks, by contrast, are nonstandard, open-ended, and require multiple interdependent decisions. Even leading AI models often fail to complete such tasks successfully (Remote Labor Index, 2026).

Provider profits: If a user attempts to complete a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ with AI, this incurs a marginal cost $m_j \geq 0$ to the AI provider. I assume that $m_E \leq m_F$, i.e., that established tasks are weakly less costly to attempt than frontier tasks. This reflects the fact that tasks where AI currently performs relatively poorly compared to labor tend to be longer and involve multiple interdependent decisions, thus requiring greater computational effort (Kwa et al., 2026; Remote Labor Index, 2026). Further, I specify that the marginal costs of AI usage are always below users' gross willingness to pay, i.e., $m_E < V_{E,0}$ and $m_F < V_{F,0}$, so that tasks in both categories can be profitably automated. Throughout the baseline analysis, I abstract from constraints on the AI provider's total capacity.[11]

The profits that the provider obtains in period t are thus

$$\pi_t = \sum_{j \in \{E,F\}} \frac{1}{2}(p_t - m_j)x_{j,t} \tag{2}$$

where $x_{j,t}$ is the share of tasks in category j that users attempt using the AI model.[12]

Throughout the baseline analysis, I assume that the AI provider myopically maximizes its profits in every period. This assumption is for tractability only. In Section 4.4, I demonstrate that the key insights extend under dynamic profit maximization.

AI learning: The AI model improves at accomplishing established and frontier tasks by being deployed to complete the respective tasks for users. Formally, the values of $s_{E,t}$ and $s_{F,t}$ evolve over time according to the following laws of motion:

$$s_{E,t+1} = \min\{s_{E,t} + \lambda_E + \rho_E x_{E,t}, 1\} \quad ; \quad s_{F,t+1} = \min\{s_{F,t} + \lambda_F + \rho_F x_{F,t}, 1\}. \tag{3}$$

The parameter $\rho_E > 0$ captures the efficiency of established-task learning, and the parameter $\rho_F > 0$ captures the efficiency of frontier-task learning.[13] There is also an exogenous upward

[11] In Section 4.5, I formalize that compute constraints tilt AI deployment toward tasks where it has the comparative advantage, which tends to decelerate aggregate AI adoption.

[12] In Section 4.6, I discuss the possibility that the shares of established and frontier tasks may change over time. If the share of tasks where AI has the comparative advantage increases, this raises the provider's incentives to exclude tasks where labor has the comparative advantage.

[13] In Section 4.7, I consider learning spillovers between tasks. Arguably, the most plausible spillovers are those through which AI deployment on frontier tasks also substantially improves performance on established

drift in the success probabilities for both tasks, represented by $\lambda_E \geq 0$ and $\lambda_F \geq 0$.[14]

Task-specific learning is a key feature of AI markets: For instance, Anthropic writes that "when a developer debugs code by collaborating with an AI model, that interaction offers valuable signals that help improve future models on similar coding tasks" (Anthropic, 2025). OpenAI runs business prompts submitted to its services through automated classifiers and can use the resulting metadata, which do not contain any protected data, for analysis (OpenAI, 2026). Combining such information with internal data on how the AI approached a task and with implicit or explicit user feedback generates learning signals. These learning signals are inherently task-specific: they reveal the successful approaches and failure sources associated with particular tasks, making them valuable for improving AI performance on similar tasks. Singh et al. (2025) provide quantitative evidence that training AI models on real-world users' queries can substantially improve performance on similar queries. The value of user-generated data for AI learning is further emphasized by Shumailov et al. (2024), who show that recursively training AI models on synthetic data alone can lead to model collapse.

A positive feedback between AI adoption on a given type of task and AI's relative proficiency at such tasks can also arise from the labor side. A large literature in labor economics documents that human capital is task-specific and that learning-by-doing is quantitatively central to its formation (Dustmann & Meghir, 2005; Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010; Dinerstein et al., 2022). When certain tasks are completed by AI rather than labor, workers have fewer opportunities to acquire or maintain the necessary task-specific skills. This reduces the effective supply of labor capable of performing these tasks, which raises the equilibrium cost of completing them using labor. If there is a single AI provider, this mechanism generates qualitatively identical predictions as task-specific AI learning. Under competition, the two learning mechanisms have slightly different effects: for example, fixing the shares of automated established and frontier tasks, AI learning is slower under symmetric competition than under monopoly because every AI provider receives less usage-based learning data. By contrast, the evolution of human skills is unaffected because it only depends on the aggregate allocation of tasks between AI and labor. I provide a detailed discussion in Section 4.9.

2.2 Analysis

Throughout the analysis, the equilibrium price of AI is denoted by p_t^*. An equilibrium is characterized by two cutoffs $\bar{x}_{E,t} \in [0,1]$ and $\bar{x}_{F,t} \in [0,1]$. For tasks in category $j \in \{E, F\}$,

tasks, but not vice versa. Such spillovers reinforce the model's predictions.

[14] In Section 4.8, I discuss the possibility that providers can also choose task-specific R&D and training expenditures. Importantly, providers have stronger incentives to invest in frontier-task capabilities when AI's comparative disadvantage at these tasks is relatively small, as they can then more readily monetize the resulting improvements. Endogenizing usage-independent AI learning thus reinforces the model's predictions.

users purchase AI if $\kappa < \bar{x}_{j,t}$ and hire labor otherwise. I say that a task which is performed by AI is *automated*, and that the probability constraints are slack if $s_{E,t} + \lambda_E + \rho_E \bar{x}_{E,t} < 1$ and $s_{F,t} + \lambda_F + \rho_F \bar{x}_{F,t} < 1$, given the equilibrium values of $\bar{x}_{E,t}$ and $\bar{x}_{F,t}$. Further, I define the total automation share as $\bar{x}_t := \frac{1}{2}\bar{x}_{E,t} + \frac{1}{2}\bar{x}_{F,t}$.

When labor has a comparative advantage at frontier tasks and vice versa, the share of frontier tasks that will be completed by AI in equilibrium is lower than the share of established tasks that are completed by AI. Thus, there are three candidates for an equilibrium: (i) an equilibrium in which no frontier tasks are automated and established tasks are at least partially automated, i.e., $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$ and $\bar{x}_{E,t} \in (0, 1]$, (ii) an equilibrium in which both frontier and established tasks are partially automated, i.e., $\bar{x}_{F,t} \in (0, 1)$ and $\bar{x}_{E,t} \in (0, 1)$, and (iii) an equilibrium in which frontier tasks are at least partially automated and all established tasks are automated, i.e., $\bar{x}_{F,t} \in (0, 1]$ and $\bar{x}_{E,t} = 1$. To streamline the analysis, I impose the tie-breaking rule that, in the knife-edge case where multiple profit-maximizing prices exist, the provider selects a price at which some frontier tasks are automated.[15]

I first characterize the learning dynamics in the different equilibrium candidates:

Lemma 1 (Monopoly: equilibrium regimes and learning dynamics)
Suppose $V_{F,t} < V_{E,t}$ and that there is no technological drift, i.e., $\lambda_E = \lambda_F = 0$.

- *The equilibrium in which no frontier tasks are automated is an absorbing state, i.e., $\bar{x}_{F,t+1} = 0$ and $\bar{x}_{E,t+1} \geq \bar{x}_{E,t}$ hold if $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$ and $\bar{x}_{E,t} > 0$.*
- *Fixing the technological state, $\bar{x}_{E,t}$ is strictly larger if the provider sets a price at which both task categories are partially automated than if no frontier tasks are automated.*

If there is no technological drift, the equilibrium in which no frontier tasks are automated is an absorbing regime. Then, AI deployment generates learning on established tasks but not on frontier tasks. As a result, users' willingness to pay for automating established tasks weakly increases over time, whereas the willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks stays the same. The provider thus continues to find it optimal to price frontier tasks out of AI adoption. Consequently, aggregate automation remains persistently low.

There is also an important complementarity between frontier-task and established-task adoption: Holding the technological state fixed, AI adoption on established tasks is strictly *higher* when frontier tasks are partially automated in equilibrium. The intuition is as follows: If serving frontier tasks is sufficiently attractive, the provider sets a relatively low AI price to attract frontier-task users, which simultaneously increases AI adoption on established tasks. The increase in AI learning on established tasks further accelerates AI adoption on

[15]Notably, this tie-breaking rule makes the emergence of learning traps less likely.

these tasks. This complementarity contrasts with other models of task-based learning such as Farboodi et al. (2026), in which AI adoption on certain tasks crowds out deployment on others, e.g., due to capacity constraints.

To characterize the resulting adoption dynamics, I first establish the conditions under which the different equilibrium regimes arise and under which the automation shares of both task types continue to increase when both are partially automated. For the formal equilibrium characterization, I assume that $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$, which ensures that some tasks are still completed by labor, the currently empirically relevant case. Then, the equilibrium regimes differ only in whether frontier tasks are partially automated or not.

Lemma 2 (Monopoly: equilibrium existence and balanced learning)
Suppose that $V_{F,t} < V_{E,t}$ *and that* $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$.

- *If* $V_{F,t} - m_F < (\sqrt{2}-1)\,(V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F)$ *in period* t*, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which no frontier tasks are automated.*
- *If* $V_{F,t} - m_F > (\sqrt{2}-1)\,(V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F)$ *in period* t*, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which both frontier and established tasks are partially automated.*

If both task types are partially automated in periods t *and* $t+1$ *and the probability constraints are slack,* $\bar{x}_{E,t+1} - \bar{x}_{E,t} > 0$ *and* $\bar{x}_{F,t+1} - \bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ *jointly hold if and only if*

$$\frac{1}{3} < \frac{v_F(\lambda_F + \rho_F \bar{x}_{F,t})}{v_E(\lambda_E + \rho_E \bar{x}_{E,t})} < 3. \tag{4}$$

The AI provider optimally sets a relatively low price that induces the automation of some frontier tasks if users' willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks is sufficiently high. Otherwise, inducing users to automate frontier tasks requires lowering the AI price so much that the resulting revenue loss from established-task users with high willingnesses to pay exceeds the additional profits from frontier-task adoption.

If the economy starts in an equilibrium with partial automation of established and frontier tasks, both automation shares increase as long as AI learning is sufficiently balanced across tasks. Intuitively, if established-task learning is very fast, the provider substantially raises the AI price over time to extract the increases in users' willingness to pay for automating established tasks. If frontier-task learning is simultaneously slow, this price increase exceeds the growth in users' willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks, so AI adoption on these tasks decreases. Conversely, rapid frontier-task learning can raise the AI price enough to reduce established-task adoption if established-task learning is slow.

The relationship between the strength of AI's comparative advantages and optimal pricing by the provider can make reductions in AI's comparative disadvantage self-reinforcing. If the

magnitude of AI's comparative disadvantage at frontier tasks falls, the provider has stronger incentives to set a relatively low price at which users would also automate some frontier tasks. The resulting increase in frontier-task deployment generates additional learning on these tasks, which induces AI's comparative disadvantage to fall even faster. This feedback can give rise to a convex takeoff in AI adoption, i.e., a path where AI adoption first increases slowly and then rapidly accelerates. I formalize this in the following proposition:

Proposition 1 (Monopoly: convex takeoff)
Suppose $r_E = r_F = r < 1$ *and that no frontier tasks are automated in equilibrium when* $t = 0$. *If* $\lambda_F > \frac{v_E}{v_F}\big(\lambda_E + \frac{\rho_E}{2}(r - m_E)\big)$, *then:*

- *There is a finite* $\hat{T} \geq 1$ *such that no frontier tasks are automated in all* $t \in [1, \hat{T})$, *whereas frontier tasks are partially automated in all* $t \geq \hat{T}$.
- *If* $V_{E,0} - m_E > (\sqrt{2}-1)(r + m_F - 2m_E)$ *holds additionally, both task types are partially automated for all* $t \geq \hat{T}$. *Further,* $\bar{x}_{t''+1} - \bar{x}_{t''} \geq \bar{x}_{t'} - \bar{x}_{t'-1}$ *holds for all* $t' \in [1, \hat{T})$ *and all* $t'' \geq \hat{T}$ *at which the probability constraints are slack.*

Moreover, $\hat{T} > 2$ *if* $\lambda_F < \frac{1}{2v_F}\big[(\sqrt{2}-1)(V_{E,0} + m_E - 2m_F) - (V_{F,0} - m_F)\big]$.

The emergence of a convex takeoff rests on three conditions. First, labor's comparative advantage at frontier tasks must initially be large enough that the provider excludes these tasks from automation. Second, technological drift in the AI's success probability at frontier tasks must be sufficiently strong. Positive drift ensures that frontier tasks are eventually automated. Strong drift ensures that they stay automated: when the provider starts serving frontier tasks, established-task adoption and learning accelerate (by Lemma 1), which could induce the provider to price frontier tasks out of adoption again if the positive drift in the AI's success probability at frontier tasks is small. Third, users' willingness to pay for automating established tasks must always be high enough that the provider never finds it optimal to exclude these tasks, which could keep total automation persistently low.

To illustrate these dynamics, I consider a parametric example in which a convex takeoff emerges. Specifically, let $v_E = 1.5$, $v_F = 1.6$, $r_E = 1.3, r_F = 1.4$, $m_E = m_F = 0.03$, $\rho_E = 0.2$, $\rho_F = 0.02$, $\lambda_E = 0$, $\lambda_F = 0.05$, $s_{E,0} = 0.3$, and $s_{F,0} = 0$. Importantly, considering this example also demonstrates that the restrictions $r_E = r_F$ and $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$ are not necessary for a convex takeoff.[16] The following figure documents the automation shares:

[16]Notably, the example also considers a setting where $V_{F,0} < 0$ to better visualize the convex shape of the path of AI adoption. Alternatively, one could have plotted the results from the first instance where users' willingness-to-pay for automating frontier tasks is positive, but these tasks are still excluded.




Figure 1: Convex Automation

This figure also visualizes the complementarity between established-task adoption and frontier-task adoption formalized in Lemma 1. When frontier tasks become partially automated, both the level of established-task automation and its growth increase.

I complete this section by formalizing the different paths the economy can take when it starts out in an initial state where both task categories are partially automated. The economy either enters a learning trap, in which the tasks where AI has a comparative disadvantage remain unautomated forever, or converges to a steady state in which established and frontier tasks are automated and AI successfully completes every task it attempts with certainty.

Proposition 2 (Monopoly: balanced automation and learning traps) *Suppose $r_E = r_F = r < 1$, $\lambda_E = \lambda_F = 0$, and that both task types are partially automated in equilibrium when $t = 0$. There exists a $\tilde{\rho}_F(\rho_E, s_{E,0}, s_{F,0})$ such that:*

- *If $\rho_F < \tilde{\rho}_F(\cdot)$, there is a finite T^* such that $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$ and $\bar{x}_{E,t+1} \geq \bar{x}_{E,t}$ for all $t \geq T^*$.*
- *If $\rho_F > \tilde{\rho}_F(\cdot)$, there exists a finite T' such that $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ and $s_{F,t} = 1$ for all $t > T'$. If further $\rho_F v_F \leq \rho_E v_E$, then $\bar{x}_{E,t} > 0$ and $s_{E,t} = 1$ additionally hold for all $t > T'$.*

Moreover, $\tilde{\rho}_F(\rho_E, s_{E,0}, s_{F,0}) > 0$ if and only if $V_{F,0} - m_F < (\sqrt{2}-1)(r + m_E - 2m_F)$. Further, $\tilde{\rho}_F(\rho_E, s_{E,0}, s_{F,0})$ is weakly increasing in ρ_E and $s_{E,0}$ and weakly decreasing in $s_{F,0}$.

Intuitively, the economy enters a learning trap if the efficiency of frontier-task learning (ρ_F) is small enough relative to the efficiency of established-task learning (ρ_E). Then, the share of frontier tasks that are automated eventually decreases over time because established-task learning raises the AI price faster than users' willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks increases. If this divergence pushes the economy into the equilibrium where no frontier tasks are automated no later than when the AI's success probability at established tasks reaches 1, the economy will remain in this regime—this constitutes a learning trap. If the

efficiency of frontier-task learning is relatively large, however, the automation share of frontier tasks never reaches zero. As a result, the economy converges to a steady state where the AI successfully completes all tasks with probability 1 if learning is sufficiently balanced.

Formally, two types of dynamic paths can lead the economy into a learning trap. Along the first type of path, the share of automated frontier tasks decreases throughout and reaches zero no later than when the AI's success probability at established tasks reaches 1. Along the second type of path, the share of automated frontier tasks first increases but eventually decreases, and again reaches zero no later than when the AI's success probability at established tasks reaches 1. No other path leads to a learning trap: if the success probability at established tasks reaches 1 while some frontier tasks are still automated, established-task learning stops while frontier-task learning continues, so frontier-task automation increases from then on. Increases in the efficiency of frontier-task learning make it less likely that the economy is on one of the two paths that give rise to a learning trap, whereas increases in the efficiency of established-task learning make it more likely. A learning trap is possible at all if and only if $V_{F,0} - m_F < (\sqrt{2} - 1)(r + m_E - 2m_F)$, i.e., when a provider potentially excludes frontier tasks if its AI always completes established tasks successfully.

To illustrate these dynamics, I consider a parametric example with $v_E = 1.5$, $v_F = 1.6$, $r_E = 1.25$, $r_F = 1.25$, $m_E = m_F = 0.025$, $\rho_E = 0.5$, and $s_{E,0} = s_{F,0} = 0.5$. I assume that there is no technological drift, i.e., $\lambda_E = \lambda_F = 0$, and consider $\rho_F \in \{0.1, 0.15\}$. This figure reinforces the insight that small decreases in the efficiency of frontier-task learning can give rise to the emergence of a learning trap in which AI adoption remains persistently low.




Figure 2: Learning Traps

Proposition 2 also formalizes that long-run automation shares are path dependent. In particular, an increase in the AI's initial success probability at frontier tasks makes it less likely that the economy enters a learning trap, whereas an increase in its initial success probability at established tasks makes the emergence of a learning trap more likely.

3 Competition

3.1 Model

Competing providers: I now consider a duopoly version of the model from the previous section. Time is discrete and indexed by t. In every period, a unit mass of users must each complete equal measures of established and frontier tasks. There are two AI providers $k \in \{A, B\}$. In every period, each provider k chooses the price at which users can attempt to complete a task using this provider's AI, which I refer to as p_t^k. Providers choose prices simultaneously. After observing the prices, every user chooses, for each task separately, whether to complete the task using labor or to attempt completion by purchasing AI from either provider. Completing a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ using labor incurs a cost of r_j. If a user attempts to complete a task by purchasing AI (no matter from which provider), she pays an independently drawn automation cost $\kappa \sim U[0, 1]$. For simplicity, I assume that the costs of AI deployment are the same across tasks, i.e., $m_E = m_F = m$.

Technology: When a user attempts to complete a task in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ by purchasing AI from provider k at time t, the probability of successful completion is given by $s_{j,t,k}$. I distinguish symmetric and asymmetric competition: If $s_{j,t,A} = s_{j,t,B}$ for both $j \in \{E, F\}$, then competition is symmetric in period t. Otherwise, competition is asymmetric.

Switching costs: For every user and task, there is a default provider—each provider exogenously is the default provider with probability 1/2 for any user-task combination. If a user attempts a task by purchasing AI from the default provider, she pays no switching cost. If she instead purchases from the non-default provider, the user pays a switching cost $\sigma \sim U[0, \tau]$, with $\tau > 0$. Higher switching costs are captured by increases in τ and correspond to less intense competition between providers. For every user and task, the switching cost is independent of the task category, the default provider, and the automation cost.

Learning: I refer to $x_{j,t,k}$ as the share of all tasks in category j that users attempt to complete using the AI of provider k at time t. The success probabilities evolve as follows:

$$s_{E,t+1,k} = \min\{s_{E,t,k} + \rho_E x_{E,t,k}, 1\} \quad ; \quad s_{F,t+1,k} = \min\{s_{F,t,k} + \rho_F x_{F,t,k}, 1\}. \tag{5}$$

I abstract from the presence of technological drift for simplicity. All other primitives from the monopoly model remain unchanged. Further, I impose that providers maximize profits in each period myopically—in particular, the equilibrium concept is static pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. I discuss dynamic profit maximization in Section 4.4.

3.2 Analysis: Symmetric Competition

In this section, I impose that competition is symmetric in the initial period under consideration and restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which both providers set the same price. I refer to equilibria in which the automation shares of both established and frontier tasks are strictly between zero and one as *interior equilibria*. Let $\bar{x}^M_{j,t}$ denote the share of tasks in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ that are automated in the monopoly benchmark. Further, let $\bar{x}^D_{j,t}$ denote the share of tasks in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ that are automated in the equilibrium that emerges under symmetric duopoly. Symmetry then implies that

$$x_{j,t,A} = x_{j,t,B} = 0.5\bar{x}^D_{j,t} \tag{6}$$

and that $s_{j,t+1,A} = s_{j,t+1,B} = s_{j,t+1}$ holds for both task categories $j \in \{E, F\}$. If competition is initially symmetric and providers play a symmetric equilibrium, competition is thus also symmetric in the next period.

When competition is symmetric, users' gross willingness to pay for automating established (respectively, frontier) tasks is the same across providers and denoted by $V_{E,t}$ (respectively, $V_{F,t}$). As in the analysis of the monopoly benchmark, I impose that labor initially has the comparative advantage at frontier tasks, i.e., $V_{F,0} < V_{E,0}$. I define $\Phi = \rho_F v_F + \rho_E v_E$ as the total efficiency of learning and $\chi = \frac{\rho_F v_F - \rho_E v_E}{\rho_F v_F + \rho_E v_E}$ as the relative efficiency of frontier-task learning. This interpretation of χ reflects the fact that χ is increasing in ρ_F and v_F. If $\rho_E = \rho_F$, $\chi > 0$ holds if and only if $v_F > v_E$.

I first characterize the equilibrium price and AI adoption under symmetric competition:

Lemma 3 (Symmetric competition: equilibrium characterization)
Fix the state of technology, and assume that $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$. *If the equilibrium is interior under monopoly, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium if competition is symmetric. This equilibrium is interior, and both providers charge the AI price*

$$p^D_t = p^M_t + \tau - \sqrt{\left(p^M_t - m\right)^2 + \tau^2}, \tag{7}$$

where $p^M_t = \frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t} + 2m}{4}$ *is the price the monopolist would quote. Furthermore:*

- *The automation share of each task category is higher under competition, i.e.,* $\bar{x}^D_{j,t} > \bar{x}^M_{j,t}$ *holds for both* $j \in \{E, F\}$.
- *Each provider receives less data under competition, i.e.,* $0.5(\bar{x}^D_{E,t} + \bar{x}^D_{F,t}) < \bar{x}^M_{E,t} + \bar{x}^M_{F,t}$.

The following proposition formalizes under what conditions AI adoption increases faster under competition than in the monopoly benchmark, and vice versa. The proposition considers

settings where $V_{F,0} - m \in \left((\sqrt{2}-1)\ (V_{E,0} + \rho_E v_E - m), (\sqrt{2}+1)(V_{E,0} - m) - \rho_F v_F\right)$ and $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$. Together, these conditions ensure that, in periods 0 and 1, the equilibrium is interior both in the monopoly benchmark and under symmetric competition.[17]

Proposition 3 (Symmetric competition: the speed of automation)
Fix the initial technological state and suppose $V_{F,0} - m \in \left((\sqrt{2}-1)\ (V_{E,0} + \rho_E v_E - m), (\sqrt{2}+1)(V_{E,0} - m) - \rho_F v_F\right)$ *and* $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$. *If the probability constraints are slack under both market structures, then:*

- *There exists a unique* $\tau^* > 0$ *such that total AI adoption increases faster between periods* 0 *and* 1 *under symmetric competition than under monopoly if and only if* $\tau < \tau^*$.
- *Fixing* Φ, τ^* *is increasing in* χ.

Three effects determine whether AI adoption increases faster or slower under competition. First, there is a data-fragmentation effect: under competition, each provider receives less total data than a monopolist in equilibrium, which slows learning and hence the growth in AI adoption. Second, there is a learning pass-through effect: improvements in the capabilities of either provider's AI translate into smaller increases in the price set by this provider under competition than in the monopoly benchmark. A given amount of overall AI learning therefore increases AI adoption more strongly under competition. Importantly, this effect becomes stronger as competition intensifies, because prices then respond even less to capability gains. Third, there is a data-composition effect: By lowering the price of AI, competition disproportionately expands AI deployment on frontier tasks and thereby increases the share of frontier-task data in providers' data pools. Frontier-task learning is therefore relatively fast under competition, which can accelerate total AI adoption.

AI adoption thus increases faster under symmetric competition if competition is sufficiently intense. The underlying intuition is as follows: If competition is weak, both the learning pass-through effect and the data composition effect are weak because the equilibrium price under competition is close to the equilibrium price in the monopoly benchmark. As a result, the data-fragmentation effect dominates and competition slows AI adoption. If competition is sufficiently strong, the learning pass-through effect is strong, and competition therefore accelerates AI adoption. A higher relative efficiency of frontier-task learning strengthens the data-composition effect and thereby widens the range of switching costs for which competition accelerates AI adoption.

[17] Imposing $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$ ensures that labor always completes some tasks in either category because the gross willingness to pay for automation is below the maximal automation cost. The second condition means that the initial willingnesses to pay for established and frontier tasks are sufficiently balanced, so that the monopolist would not find it optimal to exclude either task category in periods 0 and 1.

Competition can also accelerate AI adoption by moving the economy out of a learning trap. To highlight this, I consider a parametric example in which $v_E = 1.1$, $r_E = 1.05$, $r_F = 2.15$, $m = 0.01$, $\tau = 0.4$, $s_{E,0} = 0.5$, $s_{F,0} = 0.25$, $\rho_E = 0.075$, $\rho_F = 0.125$, and vary $v_F \in \{2.4, 2.6\}$. The following figure visualizes the total automation shares that emerge if the value of frontier-task learning is small ($v_F = 2.4$) and large ($v_F = 2.6$):




Figure 3: Symmetric Competition

If the value of frontier-task learning is low ($v_F = 2.4$), users' willingnesses-to-pay for automating established and frontier tasks are relatively similar. Thus, the economy starts in an interior equilibrium, both under competition and in the monopoly benchmark. Furthermore, competition slows the growth of AI adoption relative to monopoly because the data composition effect is weak. If the value of frontier-task learning is large ($v_F = 2.6$), users' willingness-to-pay for automating frontier tasks is relatively low initially, so a monopolist optimally excludes these tasks from automation, i.e., the economy is in a learning trap. Under competition, however, the price of AI is sufficiently low that both frontier and established tasks are automated. Hence, total AI adoption is larger under competition and grows faster.

3.3 Asymmetric Competition

In this section, I assume that competition is asymmetric. Specifically, I impose that provider A has an initial advantage at frontier tasks, whereas provider B has the advantage at established tasks. The success probabilities of the providers satisfy

$$s_{E,0,A} = s_{E,0} - \epsilon, \quad s_{F,0,A} = s_{F,0} + \epsilon, \quad s_{E,0,B} = s_{E,0} + \epsilon, \quad s_{F,0,B} = s_{F,0} - \epsilon, \tag{8}$$

so that the providers have the same average success probability across the two task types. Naturally, $s_{E,0} \in (0,1)$ and $s_{F,0} \in (0,1)$ must hold. I define $V_{j,t} = r_j - (1 - s_{j,t})v_j$ for both

$j \in \{E, F\}$, and restrict attention to values of ϵ that leave all success probabilities interior, i.e., $\epsilon < \min\{s_{E,0}, 1 - s_{E,0}, s_{F,0}, 1 - s_{F,0}\}$.

Under this type of asymmetric competition, an equilibrium in which one provider only serves established tasks and its rival only serves frontier tasks can emerge. In this asymmetric equilibrium, AI adoption grows faster than under symmetric competition if frontier-task learning is sufficiently efficient, compared to established-task learning.

Proposition 4 (Acceleration of AI Adoption Through Specialization) *Suppose $r_E = r_F = r < 1$ and $v_E < v_F$. Fix $s_{E,0}$ and $s_{F,0}$ and suppose that the equilibrium is interior under symmetric competition (i.e., if $\epsilon = 0$) in periods 0 and 1. If*

$$V_{j,0} + \epsilon v_j - m \geq \frac{7\tau}{4} + 2\max\{V_{j,0} - \epsilon v_j - m, 0\} \quad \forall j \in \{E, F\}, \tag{9}$$

then there exists an equilibrium path where, for all $t \geq 0$, all frontier tasks are either completed by labor or attempted by purchasing AI from provider A, whereas all established tasks are attempted by purchasing AI from provider B or completed using labor.

If, additionally, the probability constraints are slack in periods 0 and 1 both in this asymmetric equilibrium and under symmetric competition, and

$$\chi \;\geq\; \bar{\chi}(\epsilon) := \frac{4\left(p_0^M - p_0^D\right) + \frac{\tau}{2} - \epsilon\left(v_E + v_F\right)}{\epsilon\left(v_F - v_E\right) + V_{E,0} - V_{F,0}}, \tag{10}$$

then the aggregate automation share increases faster between periods 0 and 1 in this asymmetric equilibrium than if competition is symmetric.

Intuitively, two conditions are sufficient to ensure that AI adoption increases faster under asymmetric competition: First, if the initial technological differences are large enough, there is an equilibrium with full specialization, where provider A serves frontier tasks and provider B serves established tasks. This concentrates task-specific AI deployment on the provider with the corresponding advantage and accelerates learning on both tasks. Second, the resulting learning gains must be large enough to offset the weaker price competition under asymmetric competition. This is more likely if frontier-task learning is relatively valuable.

To reinforce these insights, I consider a parametric example and compute the paths of the task-specific automation shares and the total automation share that emerge in equilibrium. Specifically, I set $v_E = 1.5$, $v_F = 2.4$, $r_E = 1.45$, $r_F = 2.15$, $m = 0.01$, $\tau = 0.4$, $\rho_E = \rho_F = 0.05$, $s_{E,0} = 0.4$, $s_{F,0} = 0.25$, and consider $\epsilon \in \{0, 0.05\}$. The setting with $\epsilon = 0$ features symmetric competition, while the setting with $\epsilon = 0.05$ is one of asymmetric competition.




Figure 4: Asymmetric Competition

In this example, total automation is initially lower under asymmetric competition, but increases faster. There are two countervailing effects: On the one hand, price competition is less intense under asymmetric competition, so the average price of AI is relatively high. Thus, the total automation share is initially lower under asymmetric competition and the established-task automation share remains lower throughout. Both of these features slow down AI learning. On the other hand, asymmetry induces specialization: the provider with the initial advantage on frontier tasks attracts a disproportionate share of frontier-task deployment. As a result, this provider's frontier-task capability improves more rapidly than under symmetric competition, which increases the speed at which AI adoption increases. This specialization effect dominates in the example.

4 Robustness

4.1 Flat Fees

In Section B.1 of the Online Appendix, I analyze a version of the monopoly benchmark in which the provider charges a flat fee that gives users unlimited access to AI, and users differ in the share of frontier tasks they must complete. Users who have to complete a large share of frontier tasks have a relatively low willingness to pay for access to AI. However, these users generate a disproportionately large amount of frontier-task deployment and learning. The key tension from the baseline model thus extends: a high AI price selects against the users whose deployment is most valuable for learning on frontier tasks, which decelerates total AI adoption by entrenching AI's comparative advantages. Richer price-quantity menus face the same basic trade-off between extracting revenue and expanding access to frontier-task-intensive users, so allowing for such contracts does not fundamentally change the equilibrium forces from the baseline analysis. One can further establish that the key insight from Section

3.2 also extends: AI adoption increases faster under symmetric competition than in the monopoly benchmark if and only if competition is sufficiently intense.

4.2 Token Pricing and Imperfect Price Discrimination

An important assumption of the baseline analysis is that providers cannot condition the price they charge on the task category. In practice, however, payments often depend on token usage, which may vary across task categories. Providers could also potentially condition their prices on observable characteristics of individual users that reveal information about the types of tasks for which these users deploy AI. Importantly, however, the key insights of my analysis extend as long as providers cannot *perfectly* condition prices on task type. This assumption is natural. Token usage, for example, is at best an imperfect signal about task characteristics: input-token usage reflects the length of the material supplied by the user, while output-token usage depends on the desired response. Even reasoning-token usage tracks task complexity imperfectly, with models sometimes spending hundreds of tokens on trivial queries and too few on difficult ones (Aggarwal et al., 2025).

Under such imperfect price discrimination, the provider cannot perfectly separate frontier-task users from established-task users. The same pricing-learning trade-off as in the baseline model therefore remains: charging relatively high prices allows the provider to extract more surplus from established-task users with high willingness to pay, but reduces adoption by frontier-task users whose deployment is particularly valuable for frontier-task learning. More informative signals weaken this tension and can thereby accelerate AI adoption. Conversely, restrictions on price discrimination by AI providers can slow AI adoption.

4.3 Multiple Models with Varying Quality

In Section B.2 of the Online Appendix, I study an extension in which an AI provider offers two models: a legacy model and a next-generation model. I distinguish three task categories: basic, established, and frontier tasks. The success probabilities of the AI models at different tasks take the following structure:

	Basic tasks	Established tasks	Frontier tasks
Legacy AI	1	$s^L_{E,t}$	0
Next-Generation AI	1	$s^N_{E,t}$	$s^N_{F,t}$

Table 1: AI Models' Success Probabilities

I assume that the success probabilities match the inverse-S-shaped relationships between software task difficulty and the probability of successful completion documented by Kwa

et al. (2026) for different AI models: Each model successfully completes basic tasks such as simple arithmetic problems with near certainty. By contrast, all models have success probabilities close to zero for tasks that are sufficiently far beyond the capability frontier. Thus, improvements in model quality generate small gains in the probability of successful completion for tasks at the lower and upper ends of the difficulty distribution. For tasks of intermediate difficulty such as debugging code, however, success probabilities are interior and improve substantially with model quality—this can give rise to the quality premia observed in real-world AI markets.

If the legacy model's probability of successfully completing non-basic tasks is sufficiently low, users do not find it profitable to employ the legacy model on these tasks. If the price of legacy AI is below the price of next-generation AI (the empirically relevant case), the markets for the two models are then fully segmented because the next-generation model offers no performance advantage on basic tasks: Established and frontier tasks are completed using either the next-generation model or labor, and the baseline results apply verbatim.

If the legacy model can complete established tasks with a relatively high probability, this reduces the provider's incentives to exclude frontier tasks from automation because it can extract less revenue from established tasks, given that users could also complete them using the legacy model. Nevertheless, the key insights from the baseline analysis extend. This is because improvements in AI capabilities are concentrated in newer models. Hence, established-task learning relaxes the relevant screening constraint and thus strengthens the provider's incentives to focus on extracting revenue from established tasks. Conversely, learning on frontier tasks raises the profitability of serving these tasks. Thus, quality-based screening does not eliminate the central tension between extracting revenue from established tasks and promoting learning on frontier tasks. As a result, the key dynamic results extend.

4.4 Dynamic Optimization

In Section B.3 of the Online Appendix, I analyze an infinite-horizon version of the monopoly benchmark in which the provider is forward-looking. A forward-looking provider may be willing to lower current prices in order to stimulate learning. However, the core tension of the model remains: users have a relatively low willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks, even though deployment on these tasks accelerates automation. Dynamic optimization thus merely changes the weight the provider places on learning relative to current monetization.

I first prove that, as in the baseline analysis, a learning trap emerges if the AI's initial success probability at frontier tasks and the efficiency of frontier-task learning are sufficiently low. In that case, the economy eventually reaches a state in which the AI's success probability

at established tasks is one, whereas its success probability at frontier tasks is much lower, so users' willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks is low. At this point, reducing the AI price cannot generate any additional learning on established tasks. Furthermore, promoting frontier-task learning by expanding AI deployment to frontier tasks would require a discrete price cut and thus a first-order loss in current profits. Because frontier-task learning is inefficient, the resulting future gains would be too small to offset the loss in current profits. The provider therefore optimally excludes frontier tasks, which prevents learning on them and, absent technological drift, makes the learning trap permanent. Importantly, this can occur even if frontier tasks are initially automated.

I further establish that a convex takeoff in AI adoption can emerge if AI's initial comparative disadvantage at frontier tasks is sufficiently large, technological drift gradually improves frontier-task capabilities, and established-task learning is sufficiently slow. In this case, an initial phase of slow adoption growth is followed by a regime switch in which frontier tasks become automated and established-task adoption increases.

Importantly, the formal analysis in Section B.3 only considers a monopoly benchmark. However, the key insights from the analysis of competition also extend when providers are forward-looking, provided that some tasks are always completed using labor. To see why, note that the three effects which determine how symmetric competition shapes the level and growth of AI adoption carry over to settings with forward-looking providers. First, any provider receives less data under competition than if it were a monopolist, ceteris paribus, which reduces the speed at which AI adoption grows. Second, competition reduces the price of AI relative to monopoly. This increases current AI adoption and can accelerate its growth through the learning pass-through effect and because the composition of data skews more toward frontier tasks. As before, intensifying competition strengthens the latter effects, so competition is more likely to accelerate total AI adoption when it is intense. When competition is asymmetric, an equilibrium in which providers specialize can emerge. This affects the level and growth of AI adoption through the effects discussed in Section 3.3.

4.5 Compute Constraints

In Section B.4 of the Online Appendix, I integrate compute constraints into the monopoly benchmark. This means that the provider can complete at most a fixed measure of tasks using AI. Compute constraints tilt AI deployment toward tasks where AI has the comparative advantage, which moves the economy toward a learning trap. Thus, even a temporary compute constraint can have persistent effects by entrenching comparative advantages.

4.6 New Tasks and Changes in Task Shares

The baseline analysis assumes that the shares of established and frontier tasks remain constant over time. In practice, technological advancements in AI can reduce the share of tasks where AI has the comparative disadvantage. This has countervailing effects on labor displacement. On the one hand, workers are displaced from tasks at which AI acquires the comparative advantage. On the other hand, the resulting change in task composition strengthens providers' incentives to exclude the remaining frontier tasks from automation, which benefits the workers performing these tasks.

The baseline analysis also abstracts from changes in the total measure of tasks. This is motivated by recent evidence which suggests that the emergence of new tasks has so far been limited, relative to the number of tasks that can be automated (Harris, 2026). Furthermore, because AI is a general-purpose technology, it may also complete newly created tasks.

4.7 Learning Spillovers

The baseline model abstracts from learning spillovers across task categories. Arguably, the most plausible spillovers are those through which frontier-task deployment also improves AI's capabilities at established tasks, but not vice versa. This is because established tasks tend to be standardized and well-defined, whereas frontier tasks tend to be more complex, open-ended, and involve multiple interdependent decisions. These spillovers do not eliminate the central trade-off between extracting current revenue and inducing additional learning through frontier-task inclusion. Furthermore, if frontier tasks are excluded from automation, the learning dynamics are identical to those in the baseline model. As in the baseline analysis, a learning trap thus emerges if the AI's initial success probability at frontier tasks and the efficiency of frontier-task learning are small enough. If both task categories are automated, the spillovers accelerate learning on established tasks, which can promote the emergence of learning traps by strengthening providers' incentives to exclude frontier tasks.

4.8 Endogenous Adoption-Independent Technological Progress

AI providers can also invest in improving their models independently of deployment-based learning and strategically allocate R&D expenditures across task categories. Importantly, their incentives to invest in frontier-task capabilities are particularly strong when AI's comparative disadvantage at these tasks is relatively small. When labor has a strong comparative advantage at frontier tasks, providers may optimally refrain from investing in improving their AI's capabilities at these tasks because the resulting improvements are insufficient to make

serving these tasks profitable. Allowing for endogenous R&D investment in AI capabilities can thus reinforce the central mechanism underlying learning traps and convex takeoffs: changes in the magnitude of AI's comparative advantages can be self-reinforcing.

4.9 Task-Specific Human Learning

A large literature in labor economics documents that human capital is task-specific and that learning-by-doing is quantitatively central to its formation (Dustmann & Meghir, 2005; Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010; Dinerstein et al., 2022). When AI takes over tasks from workers, they have fewer opportunities to acquire and maintain the necessary task-specific skills. This increases the cost of completing these tasks using labor and, consequently, users' willingness to pay for automating them. This learning mechanism can generate effects resembling those arising from task-specific AI learning.

To understand the implications of task-specific human learning, suppose first that it is the only learning channel. Under monopoly, the predictions of the baseline analysis extend directly because the evolution of AI's comparative advantages depends solely on the aggregate allocation of tasks between AI and labor. Under symmetric competition, however, the data-fragmentation effect disappears: the evolution of human capital depends on aggregate AI adoption rather than deployment at individual providers. By contrast, equivalent forms of the learning pass-through effect and the data-composition effect operate. Under asymmetric competition, the data-concentration effect also disappears, because concentrating learning data at one provider does not affect the evolution of human capital, ceteris paribus.

When both task-specific AI and human learning are present, the key insights from the baseline analysis on competition thus extend qualitatively. However, there are two important differences. First, the minimum intensity of competition required for symmetric competition to accelerate AI adoption relative to monopoly decreases. Second, asymmetric competition becomes more likely to decelerate the growth of total AI adoption relative to symmetric competition, because the data-concentration effect becomes less important.

5 Policy Implications

The Role of Regulation: Given the speed and magnitude of developments in AI, understanding how regulation can shape technological progress in AI as well as its economic effects is a first-order policy concern. This is reflected in recent calls for stronger regulation of AI from both policymakers and AI providers themselves. The framework developed in this paper can be used to study the effects of several policy interventions, including competition

policy in AI markets, data-sharing mandates, and restrictions on the construction of AI data centers. More broadly, my results demonstrate that regulatory interventions can shape not only the economic effects of AI but also the trajectory of technological progress in AI itself.

Competition Policy: Promoting fair competition in AI markets can accelerate the speed of AI-driven labor displacement, even if it has several important benefits outside of the model. Making AI markets more competitive reduces the equilibrium price of AI. This intensifies the pass-through of improvements in AI's capabilities to AI adoption, and shifts the composition of AI learning data toward tasks where AI has a comparative disadvantage. Both of these effects accelerate AI-driven labor displacement.

Data Regulation: Data regulation can affect the evolution of AI's capabilities directly by changing the types of data that providers can use for learning. Privacy restrictions that disproportionately limit the use of frontier-task data can slow the expansion of automation into these tasks. The effects of data-sharing mandates are nuanced. For example, requiring a dominant AI provider to share data on established tasks improves its rivals' capabilities on these tasks. This strengthens their incentives to exclude frontier tasks in order to extract more revenue from established tasks. However, such a mandate also intensifies competition for established tasks, which could induce the dominant provider to expand deployment to frontier tasks. The effects of data regulation therefore depend not only on how much data providers can access, but also on the task composition of those data and how data access is distributed across providers.

Compute Constraints: Policies that temporarily restrict AI providers' compute capacity can have persistent effects. If compute is scarce, providers optimally allocate it toward the tasks for which users have the highest willingness to pay. Implementing a sufficiently tight compute constraint in the early stages of AI development can therefore reduce frontier-task deployment and learning enough to push the economy into a learning trap. Because the resulting lack of frontier-task data can make this regime self-sustaining, automation may remain low even when compute constraints are no longer relevant. Thus, temporary limits on compute capacity can have effects that persist in the long run. I formalize these topics in Section B.4 of the Online Appendix, and now show how the implementation of a compute constraint that is only active in the first five periods shapes the paths of the automation shares in a parametric example:[18]

[18]The parameters are $s_{E,0} = 0.5$, $s_{F,0} = 0.5$, $v_E = 1.5$, $v_F = 1.6$, $r_E = 1.25$, $r_F = 1.25$, $m_E = m_F = 0.025$, $\lambda_E = \lambda_F = 0$, $\rho_E = 0.4$, and $\rho_F = 0.1$. The maximal capacity is $\bar{K}_t = 0.3$ for the first five periods.




Figure 5: Compute Constraints

6 Conclusion

This paper studies how AI providers' strategic pricing incentives and competition between them determine the speed of AI-driven labor displacement by shaping the trajectory of technological progress in AI. The central economic tension is that users have a relatively low willingness to pay for automating tasks where AI has a comparative disadvantage, even though AI deployment and learning on these tasks accelerate total AI adoption.

The central insight of this paper is that AI providers' market power and the nature of competition between them affect the speed of AI-driven labor displacement by influencing how AI's capabilities develop. Furthermore, regulatory interventions in AI markets can shape not only the economic effects of AI but also the underlying nature of technological advancements in AI. For example, even temporary restrictions on providers' compute capacity can keep total AI adoption persistently low by strengthening the magnitude of AI's comparative advantages. This points to a broader insight: Technological progress in AI is not determined by technological factors alone, but is fundamentally shaped by AI providers' strategic decisions. By influencing the economic environment in which providers operate, policymakers can therefore shape the nature of technological advancements in AI.

A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1: Define $D(z) := \min\{\max\{z, 0\}, 1\}$, and recall the maintained restrictions $0 \leq m_E \leq m_F < V_{F,t} < V_{E,t}$. At valuations $(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t})$, profits at price p are

$$\Pi(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}; p) = \frac{1}{2}(p - m_E)D(V_{E,t} - p) + \frac{1}{2}(p - m_F)D(V_{F,t} - p). \tag{11}$$

Part 1: Exclusion is absorbing.

Suppose $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0 < \bar{x}_{E,t}$, and let p be the equilibrium price. Then $V_{F,t} \leq p < V_{E,t}$ and $p > m_E$ must hold, since strictly positive profits are feasible. By the maintained tie-breaking rule, $\Pi(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}; p) > \Pi(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}; q)$ must hold for every feasible $q < V_{F,t}$.

Without drift or frontier-task deployment, $V_{F,t+1} = V_{F,t}$ and $V_{E,t+1} = V_{E,t} + \delta$ for some $\delta \geq 0$. For any $z < V_{E,t}$, define

$$\Delta_z := D(V_{E,t} + \delta - z) - D(V_{E,t} - z) = \min\{\delta, \max\{1 - V_{E,t} + z, 0\}\}. \tag{12}$$

For every $q < V_{F,t} \leq p < V_{E,t}$, we therefore have $\Delta_p \geq \Delta_q \geq 0$. Consequently,

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Pi(V_{E,t+1}, V_{F,t+1}; p) - \Pi(V_{E,t+1}, V_{F,t+1}; q) \\
&\quad = \Pi(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}; p) - \Pi(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}; q) + \frac{1}{2}(p - m_E)(\Delta_p - \Delta_q) + \frac{1}{2}(p - q)\Delta_q > 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Thus no price serving frontier tasks is optimal at $t+1$, so $\bar{x}_{F,t+1} = 0$.

Conditional on excluding frontier tasks, the unique optimal share is

$$x_E^{\text{ex}}(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) = \min\left\{1, V_{E,t} - V_{F,t}, \frac{V_{E,t} - m_E}{2}\right\},$$

which is nondecreasing in $V_{E,t}$. Hence

$$\bar{x}_{E,t+1} = x_E^{\text{ex}}(V_{E,t+1}, V_{F,t+1}) \geq x_E^{\text{ex}}(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) = \bar{x}_{E,t}.$$

Iterating establishes absorption of the exclusion regime.

Part 2: Complementarity.

Fix the technological state. If both task categories are partially automated at price p, then $p < V_{F,t}$ and $0 < V_{E,t} - p < 1$ must hold. Any price p' excluding frontier tasks must satisfy $p' \geq V_{F,t} > p$. Thus, $V_{E,t} - p' < 1$, and hence

$$\bar{x}_{E,t}(p') = D(V_{E,t} - p') = \max\{V_{E,t} - p', 0\} < V_{E,t} - p = \bar{x}_{E,t}(p).$$

This proves the second statement. ■

Proof of Lemma 2:

Part 1: Optimal prices

Suppress the time subscript and recall $0 \leq m_E \leq m_F < V_F < V_E$. Further, note that $V_E < 1$ because $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$. Since positive profits are feasible, we can restrict attention to prices $p \in [0, V_E]$. The provider's profits are

$$\pi(p) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}(p - m_E)(V_E - p) + \frac{1}{2}(p - m_F)(V_F - p), & p < V_F, \\ \frac{1}{2}(p - m_E)(V_E - p), & p \geq V_F. \end{cases}$$

Both branches are strictly concave. At $p = V_F$, the right derivative exceeds the left derivative, so the kink cannot maximize profits.

The two remaining candidates for an optimal price are therefore

$$p^{EF} = \frac{V_E + V_F + m_E + m_F}{4}, \qquad p^E = \frac{V_E + m_E}{2},$$

provided they lie in their regions. The corresponding unconstrained profit maxima are

$$\pi^{EF} = \frac{(V_E + V_F + m_E + m_F)^2}{16} - \frac{m_E V_E + m_F V_F}{2}, \quad \pi^E = \frac{(V_E - m_E)^2}{8}. \tag{13}$$

Direct calculation yields

$$\begin{aligned} 16(\pi^{EF} - \pi^E) = &\Big[V_F - m_F - (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_E + m_E - 2m_F)\Big] \\ &\times \Big[V_F - m_F + (\sqrt{2} + 1)(V_E + m_E - 2m_F)\Big]. \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Case 1: Suppose $V_F - m_F < (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_E + m_E - 2m_F)$. Then

$$V_E + m_E - 2m_F > (\sqrt{2} + 1)(V_F - m_F) > 2(V_F - m_F),$$

implying $p^E > V_F$. Thus, p^E is admissible. Moreover, the first factor in (14) is negative, whereas the second is positive. Consequently, $\pi^E > \pi^{EF}$. Since π^{EF} is an upper bound on profits from prices serving both task categories, p^E is uniquely optimal and $\bar{x}_F = 0$.

Case 2: Suppose $V_F - m_F > (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_E + m_E - 2m_F)$. Then

$$V_E + m_E - 2m_F < (\sqrt{2} + 1)(V_F - m_F) < 3(V_F - m_F),$$

implying $p^{EF} < V_F$. Thus, p^{EF} is admissible.

If $p^E > V_F$, then $V_E + m_E - 2m_F > 2(V_F - m_F) > 0$. Both factors in (14) are therefore positive, so $\pi^{EF} > \pi^E$. If instead $p^E \leq V_F$, the highest profit attainable while excluding frontier tasks is $\pi(V_F)$. Since $p^{EF} < V_F$ and the joint-service profit function is strictly concave, $\pi^{EF} > \pi(V_F)$. Hence p^{EF} is uniquely optimal in either case.

Part 2: Balanced Learning

Suppose both task categories are partially automated in periods t and $t+1$. Their optimal automation shares satisfy

$$\bar{x}_{E,t} = \frac{3V_{E,t} - V_{F,t} - m_E - m_F}{4}, \qquad \bar{x}_{F,t} = \frac{3V_{F,t} - V_{E,t} - m_E - m_F}{4}.$$

Writing $\Delta V_{j,t} := V_{j,t+1} - V_{j,t}$, taking differences yields

$$\bar{x}_{E,t+1} - \bar{x}_{E,t} = \frac{3\Delta V_{E,t} - \Delta V_{F,t}}{4}, \qquad \bar{x}_{F,t+1} - \bar{x}_{F,t} = \frac{3\Delta V_{F,t} - \Delta V_{E,t}}{4}.$$

Since the probability constraints are slack, $\Delta V_{j,t} = v_j(\lambda_j + \rho_j \bar{x}_{j,t}) > 0$. Both automation shares therefore increase strictly if and only if

$$\frac{1}{3} < \frac{\Delta V_{F,t}}{\Delta V_{E,t}} = \frac{v_F(\lambda_F + \rho_F \bar{x}_{F,t})}{v_E(\lambda_E + \rho_E \bar{x}_{E,t})} < 3. \tag{15}$$

■

Proof of Proposition 1: The learning laws imply that both willingnesses to pay are nondecreasing. Hence, the maintained assumptions give $0 \leq m_E \leq m_F < \min\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\} \leq \max\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\} \leq r < 1$ at every date.

Positive profits are feasible by choosing a price between m_F and $\min\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\}$. Prices weakly below m_E yield nonpositive profits, and prices weakly above $\max\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\}$ generate no demand. Consequently, every optimal price satisfies $m_E < p_t^* < \max\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\} \leq r$. In particular, $\bar{x}_{j,t} = \max\{V_{j,t} - p_t^*, 0\} \leq r - m_E < 1$ for both $j \in \{E, F\}$. Thus, any positive automation share is strictly below one. On the relevant nonnegative price range, profits are

$$\pi_t(p) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j \in \{E,F\}} (p - m_j) \max\{V_{j,t} - p, 0\}.$$

The learning laws can equivalently be written as $V_{j,t+1} = \min\left\{r,\, V_{j,t} + v_j(\lambda_j + \rho_j \bar{x}_{j,t})\right\}$.

Part 1: Frontier tasks are eventually automated.

The assumed lower bound implies $\lambda_F > 0$. Therefore, $s_{F,t} \geq \min\{s_{F,0} + t\lambda_F, 1\}$, so $s_{F,t}$ becomes 1 in finite time and remains equal to one thereafter. At all dates where $s_{F,t} = 1$, $V_{F,t} = r \geq V_{E,t}$. Since $p_t^* < r$, frontier tasks are partially automated.

Part 2: Frontier-task inclusion cannot be reversed.

Define $H_t := V_{F,t} - m_F - (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F)$. If $V_{F,t} < V_{E,t}$, Lemma 2 gives

$$H_t < 0 \implies \bar{x}_{F,t} = 0, \qquad H_t > 0 \implies \bar{x}_{F,t} > 0.$$

These implications also hold when the valuation ordering is reversed. Indeed, if $V_{F,t} \geq V_{E,t}$, then $p_t^* < V_{F,t}$ implies $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$, and

$$H_t = (2 - \sqrt{2})(V_{F,t} - m_F) + (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_{F,t} - V_{E,t} + m_F - m_E) > 0.$$

Thus, the two implications hold at every date, regardless of the valuation ordering.

The bound $\bar{x}_{E,t} \leq r - m_E$ on established-task adoption implies

$$V_{E,t+1} - V_{E,t} \leq v_E\big(\lambda_E + \rho_E(r - m_E)\big).$$

If $s_{F,t+1} < 1$, frontier-task learning is not truncated, so $V_{F,t+1} - V_{F,t} = v_F(\lambda_F + \rho_F \bar{x}_{F,t}) \geq v_F \lambda_F$. Consequently,

$$\begin{aligned} H_{t+1} - H_t &\geq v_F\lambda_F - (\sqrt{2} - 1)v_E\big(\lambda_E + \rho_E(r - m_E)\big) \\ &> v_E\left[(2 - \sqrt{2})\lambda_E + \left(\frac{3}{2} - \sqrt{2}\right)\rho_E(r - m_E)\right] > 0, \end{aligned}$$

where the second inequality uses the assumed lower bound on λ_F.

If instead $s_{F,t+1} = 1$, then $V_{F,u} = r \geq V_{E,u}$ for every $u \geq t + 1$. The preceding argument therefore gives $H_u > 0$ at every such date.

By part 1, the first date $\hat{T} := \min\{t \geq 0 : \bar{x}_{F,t} > 0\}$ is finite. Initial exclusion implies $\hat{T} \geq 1$. Moreover, $\bar{x}_{F,\hat{T}} > 0$ implies $H_{\hat{T}} \geq 0$. The preceding inequalities then imply $H_t > 0$ for every $t > \hat{T}$, and hence $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ at every subsequent date. By the definition of $\hat{T}$, frontier tasks are excluded at every earlier date. This proves the first conclusion.

Part 3: The additional condition $V_{E,0} - m_E > (\sqrt{2}-1)(r + m_F - 2m_E)$ rules out established-task exclusion.

Suppose $V_{E,0} - m_E > (\sqrt{2}-1)(r + m_F - 2m_E)$. Monotonicity of $V_{E,t}$ and the bound $V_{F,t} \leq r$ imply $V_{E,t} - m_E > (\sqrt{2}-1)(V_{F,t} + m_F - 2m_E)$ at every date.

If $V_{E,t} \geq V_{F,t}$, then $p_t^* < V_{E,t}$ already guarantees $\bar{x}_{E,t} > 0$. It remains to consider $V_{E,t} < V_{F,t}$. In this case, the preceding inequality implies

$$V_{F,t} + m_F - 2m_E < (1+\sqrt{2})(V_{E,t} - m_E) < 3(V_{E,t} - m_E).$$

Therefore, the joint-service candidate price $p_t^{EF} = \frac{V_{E,t}+V_{F,t}+m_E+m_F}{4}$ satisfies $0 < p_t^{EF} < V_{E,t} < V_{F,t}$ and serves both task categories.

Any price excluding established tasks yields profits at most $(V_{F,t} - m_F)^2/8$, the unconstrained maximum of the frontier-only profit function. Direct calculation gives

$$\begin{aligned} 16\left[\pi_t(p_t^{EF}) - \frac{(V_{F,t}-m_F)^2}{8}\right] &= \Big[V_{E,t} - m_E - (\sqrt{2}-1)(V_{F,t} + m_F - 2m_E)\Big] \\ &\times \Big[V_{E,t} - m_E + (\sqrt{2}+1)(V_{F,t} + m_F - 2m_E)\Big] > 0. \end{aligned}$$

The first factor is positive by the additional condition. The second is positive because $V_{E,t} > m_E$ and $V_{F,t} + m_F - 2m_E > 0$.

Thus, excluding established tasks cannot be optimal. Together with the result of part 2, this implies that both task categories are partially automated for every $t \geq \hat{T}$.

Part 4: Comparing adoption growth before and after the switch.

At any date $t < \hat{T}$, frontier tasks are excluded. This implies $H_t \leq 0$, and hence

$$V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F \geq (1+\sqrt{2})(V_{F,t} - m_F) > 2(V_{F,t} - m_F).$$

The optimal exclusion price $p_t^E = (V_{E,t} + m_E)/2$ therefore exceeds $V_{F,t}$ and is admissible. Consequently,

$$\bar{x}_{E,t} = \frac{V_{E,t} - m_E}{2} \leq \frac{r - m_E}{2}, \qquad \bar{x}_t = \frac{V_{E,t} - m_E}{4}.$$

For every $t' \in [1, \hat{T})$, both $t'-1$ and t' precede the switch. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{x}_{t'} - \bar{x}_{t'-1} &= \frac{V_{E,t'} - V_{E,t'-1}}{4} \\ &\leq \frac{v_E}{4}\big(\lambda_E + \rho_E \bar{x}_{E,t'-1}\big) \leq \frac{v_E}{4}\left(\lambda_E + \frac{\rho_E}{2}(r - m_E)\right).\end{aligned}$$

These inequalities allow established-task learning to be truncated at one.

For every $t \geq \hat{T}$, both categories are partially automated by part 3. The optimal price is therefore p_t^{EF}, giving $\bar{x}_t = \frac{V_{E,t}+V_{F,t}-m_E-m_F}{4}$. Hence, at any $t'' \geq \hat{T}$ at which the probability constraints are slack,

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{x}_{t''+1} - \bar{x}_{t''} &= \frac{1}{4}\Big[v_E(\lambda_E + \rho_E \bar{x}_{E,t''}) + v_F(\lambda_F + \rho_F \bar{x}_{F,t''})\Big] \\ &\geq \frac{v_F \lambda_F}{4} > \frac{v_E}{4}\left(\lambda_E + \frac{\rho_E}{2}(r - m_E)\right).\end{aligned}$$

Combining the two bounds establishes the stated growth comparison with a strict inequality.

Part 5: A sufficient condition for $\hat{T} > 2$.

The additional upper bound on drift is equivalent to $2v_F\lambda_F < -H_0$. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that $\hat{T} \leq 2$. Because frontier tasks are excluded at every date before $\hat{T}$, they generate no endogenous learning before that date. Consequently,

$$V_{F,\hat{T}} = \min\{r, V_{F,0} + \hat{T} v_F \lambda_F\} \leq V_{F,0} + \hat{T} v_F \lambda_F, \qquad V_{E,\hat{T}} \geq V_{E,0}.$$

Hence, $H_{\hat{T}} \leq H_0 + \hat{T} v_F \lambda_F \leq H_0 + 2v_F\lambda_F < 0$. This contradicts $\bar{x}_{F,\hat{T}} > 0$. Thus, $\hat{T} > 2$. ■

Proof of Proposition 2: Recall the maintained assumptions $0 \leq m_E \leq m_F < V_{F,0} < V_{E,0} \leq r < 1$. Since valuations are nondecreasing, both task categories can be profitably served at every date. Every optimal price hence satisfies $m_E < p_t^* < \max\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\} \leq r < 1$.

If both categories are automated, the equilibrium price is $p_t^* = \frac{V_{E,t}+V_{F,t}+m_E+m_F}{4}$ and the automation shares are

$$\bar{x}_{E,t} = \frac{3V_{E,t} - V_{F,t} - m_E - m_F}{4} \quad , \quad \bar{x}_{F,t} = \frac{3V_{F,t} - V_{E,t} - m_E - m_F}{4}. \tag{16}$$

Since $\lambda_E = \lambda_F = 0$ and $r_E = r_F = r$, valuations evolve according to

$$V_{j,t+1} = \min\left\{r,\, V_{j,t} + \rho_j v_j \bar{x}_{j,t}\right\}, \qquad j \in \{E, F\}. \tag{17}$$

Part 1: Characterizing paths that lead to a learning trap.

A path leads to a learning trap if there exists a T^* such that $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$ for all $t \geq T^*$.

Define $H(V_E, V_F) := V_F - m_F - (\sqrt{2}-1)(V_E + m_E - 2m_F)$. By the arguments in the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 as well as the maintained tie-breaking rule, we have:

$$\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0 \quad \iff \quad H(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) < 0. \tag{18}$$

If $H(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) = 0$, $V_{F,t} < V_{E,t}$ must hold and the provider is indifferent between exclusion and inclusion by the arguments in the proof of Lemma 2. By the maintained tie-breaking rule, it serves frontier tasks. Once exclusion occurs, it is absorbing by Lemma 1.

We now establish important characteristics of a path that leads to a learning trap.

(i) Along a path that leads to a learning trap, $V_{E,t} > V_{F,t}$ must always hold.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that there is a path leading to a learning trap on which $V_{E,t} \leq V_{F,t}$ holds at some t.

Suppose $\rho_F v_F > \rho_E v_E$. If $V_{F,t} \geq V_{E,t}$, then $\bar{x}_{F,t} \geq \bar{x}_{E,t}$ holds. Given that $\rho_F v_F > \rho_E v_E$, the ordering $V_{F,t} \geq V_{E,t}$ will also hold in the future, so frontier tasks remain at least partially automated throughout, a contradiction.

Suppose $\rho_F v_F \leq \rho_E v_E$. If $V_{E,t} \geq V_{F,t}$, then $\bar{x}_{E,t} \geq \bar{x}_{F,t}$ holds. Equation (17) therefore preserves this ordering. Starting from $V_{E,0} > V_{F,0}$, equality can first occur only when both valuations reach r, which rules out subsequent frontier exclusion, a contradiction.

(ii) Along a path leading to a learning trap, $s_{E,t} < 1$ must hold for all t at which $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that there is a path leading to a learning trap on which there is a t where $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ and $s_{E,t} = 1$. Then, $V_{E,t} = r$, so H is nondecreasing over time thereafter because V_E remains constant and V_F cannot decrease. Thus, $H(V_{E,x}, V_{F,x}) \geq 0$ holds for all $x \geq t$ because $H(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) \geq 0$, given that $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$. Thus, frontier tasks would never be excluded in the future, a contradiction.

(iii) Along a path leading to a learning trap with first exclusion date T^*, the frontier-task automation share is either strictly decreasing on $\{0, ..., T^*\}$, or weakly increasing up to some $t_0 < T^*$ and strictly decreasing on $\{t_0, ..., T^*\}$.

On a path leading to a trap, if both t and $t+1$ precede first exclusion, both categories are automated at both dates and neither valuation has reached r at $t+1$, by the preceding arguments. The update from t to $t+1$ is therefore untruncated, so

$$\bar{x}_{F,t+1} - \bar{x}_{F,t} = \frac{3\rho_F v_F \bar{x}_{F,t} - \rho_E v_E \bar{x}_{E,t}}{4} \quad , \quad \bar{x}_{E,t+1} - \bar{x}_{E,t} = \frac{3\rho_E v_E \bar{x}_{E,t} - \rho_F v_F \bar{x}_{F,t}}{4}.$$

If $\bar{x}_{F,t+1} - \bar{x}_{F,t} \leq 0$, $\bar{x}_{E,t+1} - \bar{x}_{E,t} > 0$ must hold. This implies that $\bar{x}_{F,t+2} - \bar{x}_{F,t+1} < 0$.[19] Once the frontier-task automation share starts weakly decreasing, it thus remains strictly decreasing until exclusion. At the transition into exclusion, frontier adoption falls to zero. On a path leading to a learning trap, the frontier-task automation share must eventually weakly decrease (given that we start in a situation where $\bar{x}_{F,0} > 0$ by assumption). By the previous arguments, it will be strictly decreasing thereafter until exclusion. The result follows.

Part 2: Comparison of learning paths.

Consider two economies, denoted by Y and Z, with identical remaining primitives and

$$\rho_E^Y \geq \rho_E^Z, \qquad \rho_F^Y \leq \rho_F^Z, \qquad V_{E,0}^Y \geq V_{E,0}^Z, \qquad V_{F,0}^Y \leq V_{F,0}^Z.$$

Suppose both economies initially automate both task categories and economy Z first excludes frontier tasks at some T. We show that economy Y excludes frontier tasks no later than T.

Suppose, for a contradiction, that frontier tasks are automated in economy Y for all $t \leq T$. By part 1(i), $V_{E,t}^Z > V_{F,t}^Z$ must hold for every $t \leq T$ because this economy is on a path that leads to a learning trap. We now establish by induction that

$$V_{E,t}^Y \geq V_{E,t}^Z, \qquad V_{F,t}^Y \leq V_{F,t}^Z \tag{19}$$

for all $t \leq T$. First note that the inequalities hold initially.

Suppose they hold at some $t < T$. Because $V_{E,t}^Z > V_{F,t}^Z$, it follows that

$$V_{E,t}^Y \geq V_{E,t}^Z > V_{F,t}^Z \geq V_{F,t}^Y.$$

Note that frontier tasks are automated in both economies for all $t < T$ by hypothesis. Thus, each price is below the frontier valuation and hence also below its established valuation, given the ordering just established. Thus, both economies are in the joint-adoption regime at date t, and (16) implies $\bar{x}_{E,t}^Y \geq \bar{x}_{E,t}^Z$, and $\bar{x}_{F,t}^Y \leq \bar{x}_{F,t}^Z$.

Together with the ordering of learning efficiencies, $\rho_E^Y v_E \bar{x}_{E,t}^Y \geq \rho_E^Z v_E \bar{x}_{E,t}^Z$, and $\rho_F^Y v_F \bar{x}_{F,t}^Y \leq \rho_F^Z v_F \bar{x}_{F,t}^Z$. The learning laws (17), including their truncation at r, therefore preserve (19) at $t+1$. This completes the induction.

At date T, economy Z excludes frontier tasks, so $H(V_{E,T}^Z, V_{F,T}^Z) < 0$.[20] Since H is de-

[19] If $t+2 < T^*$, this follows by the previous arguments. If $t+2 = T^*$, this holds by construction because $\bar{x}_{F,t+2} = 0$ whereas $\bar{x}_{F,t+1} > 0$.

[20] Note that the function H is the same in both economies, as the marginal costs are the same.

creasing in established valuation and increasing in frontier valuation,

$$H(V_{E,T}^Y, V_{F,T}^Y) \leq H(V_{E,T}^Z, V_{F,T}^Z) < 0.$$

Thus, economy Y also excludes frontier tasks at date T, a contradiction.

Part 3: Existence of the cutoff and comparative statics.

Fix ρ_E and the initial state, and define $\mathcal{T} := \{\rho_F > 0 : \exists T < \infty \text{ such that } \bar{x}_{F,T} = 0\}$. By part 2, $\mathcal{T}$ is downward closed.

Furthermore, initial frontier adoption $\bar{x}_{F,0} > 0$ is independent of ρ_F. Therefore, if $\rho_F \geq \frac{1-s_{F,0}}{\bar{x}_{F,0}}$, the frontier-task success probability reaches one in period 1. Since $V_{F,t} = r \geq V_{E,t}$ thereafter, frontier tasks cannot be excluded. Thus, $\mathcal{T}$ is bounded above.

Define

$$\widetilde{\rho}_F(\rho_E, s_{E,0}, s_{F,0}) := \sup \mathcal{T}, \qquad \sup \varnothing := 0.$$

Downward closure implies that every $0 < \rho_F < \widetilde{\rho}_F$ generates a learning trap, whereas no $\rho_F > \widetilde{\rho}_F$ does. Once the regime in which frontier tasks are excluded is reached, Lemma 1 implies $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$, and $\bar{x}_{E,t+1} \geq \bar{x}_{E,t}$ at every later date. This establishes the first conclusion of the proposition.

Part 2 also establishes the comparative statics. Increasing ρ_E or $s_{E,0}$, or decreasing $s_{F,0}$, weakly expands $\mathcal{T}$. Consequently, $\widetilde{\rho}_F$ is weakly increasing in ρ_E and $s_{E,0}$ and weakly decreasing in $s_{F,0}$, on the maintained domain of initial states.

Part 4: Paths without a learning trap.

Suppose $\rho_F > \widetilde{\rho}_F$. Frontier tasks are then automated at every date. We establish that $\bar{x}_{F,t}$ is uniformly bounded away from zero.

If $V_{E,t} > V_{F,t}$, both categories are automated and $H(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) \geq 0$. Hence,

$$4\bar{x}_{F,t} = 3(V_{F,t} - m_F) - (V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F) \geq (2 - \sqrt{2})(V_{F,t} - m_F).$$

If instead $V_{F,t} \geq V_{E,t}$, the equilibrium either serves only frontier tasks or serves both categories. On the frontier-only branch, $\bar{x}_{F,t} = \frac{V_{F,t} - m_F}{2}$. On the joint-adoption branch,

$$\bar{x}_{F,t} - \frac{V_{F,t} - m_F}{2} = \frac{V_{F,t} - V_{E,t} + m_F - m_E}{4} \geq 0.$$

The frontier-only formula applies because the profit function is strictly concave on that branch and the kink at $p = V_{E,t}$ cannot maximize profits: its right derivative exceeds its left derivative by $(V_{E,t} - m_E)/2 > 0$.[21] Thus, in every period,

$$\bar{x}_{F,t} \geq \frac{2-\sqrt{2}}{4}(V_{F,0} - m_F) =: \underline{x}_F > 0.$$

Since $\rho_F > 0$, the learning law implies $s_{F,t} \geq \min\{1, s_{F,0} + t\rho_F \underline{x}_F\}$.

Consequently, frontier-task capability reaches one in finite time and remains there. Since $V_{F,t} = r \geq V_{E,t}$ thereafter, frontier tasks remain positively automated.

Suppose additionally that $\rho_F v_F \leq \rho_E v_E$. As established in part 1, this condition preserves $V_{E,t} \geq V_{F,t}$. Therefore, established valuation reaches r no later than frontier valuation. After both valuations reach r, the optimal price is strictly below r, so both categories remain positively automated. This establishes the second conclusion.

Part 5: Characterization of a strictly positive cutoff.

Define $\eta := (\sqrt{2}-1)(r + m_E - 2m_F) - (V_{F,0} - m_F)$. Suppose first that $\eta \leq 0$. Since $V_{F,t} \geq V_{F,0}$ and $V_{E,t} \leq r$, $H(V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}) \geq -\eta \geq 0$ at every date. Frontier tasks can therefore never be excluded, implying $\widetilde{\rho}_F = 0$.

Now suppose $\eta > 0$. Initial joint adoption implies $V_{E,0} < r$. Define

$$\underline{x}_E := \frac{2V_{E,0} - m_E - m_F}{4} > 0,$$

and $N := \left\lceil \frac{r - V_{E,0}}{\rho_E v_E \underline{x}_E} \right\rceil \geq 1$.

Now suppose $\rho_F \in \left(0, \min\left\{\frac{\rho_E v_E}{v_F}, \frac{\eta}{N v_F}\right\}\right)$. The first bound ensures that $V_{E,t} \geq V_{F,t}$ at every date. The second bound ensures that frontier-task learning is sufficiently slow.

Suppose, toward a contradiction, that frontier tasks are not excluded in any period $t \leq N$. Then both categories are automated throughout these periods. For every $t < N$,

$$\bar{x}_{E,t} = \frac{3V_{E,t} - V_{F,t} - m_E - m_F}{4} \geq \frac{2V_{E,t} - m_E - m_F}{4} \geq \underline{x}_E.$$

Equation (17) therefore implies that $V_{E,N} = r$.

Meanwhile, frontier-task adoption is at most one, so $V_{F,N} \leq V_{F,0} + N\rho_F v_F$. Consequently,

$$H(V_{E,N}, V_{F,N}) \leq V_{F,0} + N\rho_F v_F - m_F - (\sqrt{2}-1)(r + m_E - 2m_F) = -\eta + N\rho_F v_F < 0.$$

[21] This argument follows because the exclusion of established tasks requires $V_{F,t} > V_{E,t}$.

The last inequality holds because $\rho_F < \frac{\eta}{N v_F}$. This contradicts continued frontier-task automation at date N. Hence, every sufficiently small positive ρ_F generates a learning trap, implying $\widetilde{\rho}_F > 0$. Combining both directions establishes

$$\widetilde{\rho}_F > 0 \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad V_{F,0} - m_F < (\sqrt{2} - 1)(r + m_E - 2m_F).$$

This completes the proof. ■

Proof of Lemma 3:

Part 1: Characterizing a symmetric interior equilibrium.

Fix the technological state and suppose that both task types are partially automated under monopoly. Throughout the proof, omit the common task-mass factor 1/2 from profits. Recall that $D(z) := \min\{\max\{z, 0\}, 1\}$. When a provider charges p and its rival charges q, its demand in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ is

$$x_{j,t}(p, q) = \frac{D(V_{j,t} - p)}{2}\left(1 - \frac{\min\{\tau, \max\{p - q, 0\}\}}{\tau}\right) + \int_0^{\min\{\tau, \max\{q-p,0\}\}} \frac{D(V_{j,t} - p - \sigma)}{2\tau}\, d\sigma.$$

The two terms represent purchases by its own default users and its rival's default users, respectively. Define

$$\pi_t(p, q) := (p - m) \sum_{j \in \{E,F\}} x_{j,t}(p, q), \qquad F_t(p) := (p - m) \sum_{j \in \{E,F\}} D(V_{j,t} - p).$$

Thus, F_t is the normalized monopoly profit function, and $\pi_t(p, p) = F_t(p)/2$.

The interior monopoly optimum globally maximizes F_t and satisfies $m < p_t^M < \min\{V_{E,t}, V_{F,t}\}$. Its first-order condition gives

$$p_t^M = \frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t} + 2m}{4}, \qquad \bar{x}_{E,t}^M + \bar{x}_{F,t}^M = \frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t} - 2m}{2} = 2(p_t^M - m). \tag{20}$$

Consider any symmetric interior equilibrium under competition, with common price p. At a symmetric interior price pair, each provider serves half the automated tasks in each

category, and the demand formulas imply

$$x_{j,t}(p,p) = \frac{1}{2}(V_{j,t} - p), \qquad \partial_1 x_{j,t}(p,p) = -\frac{1}{2} - \frac{V_{j,t} - p}{2\tau}.$$

Consequently,

$$\partial_1 \pi_t(p,p) = \frac{1}{2}\left[F_t'(p) - \frac{F_t(p)}{\tau}\right].$$

Equivalently, the provider's pricing first-order condition is

$$\frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t} - 2p}{2} - (p - m)\left[1 + \frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t} - 2p}{2\tau}\right] = 0.$$

Utilizing (20) yields $V_{E,t}+V_{F,t}-2p = 4(p_t^M - m) - 2(p-m)$. Plugging this into the first-order condition yields

$$(p-m)^2 - 2(p_t^M - m + \tau)(p-m) + 2\tau(p_t^M - m) = 0.$$

The larger root implies negative total demand and is therefore inadmissible. In any symmetric interior equilibrium, both firms must thus charge the candidate price

$$p_t^D = p_t^M + \tau - \sqrt{(p_t^M - m)^2 + \tau^2}.$$

Because $p_t^M > m$ and $\tau > 0$, $\tau < \sqrt{(p_t^M - m)^2 + \tau^2} < p_t^M - m + \tau$. Consequently,

$$m < p_t^D < p_t^M. \tag{21}$$

Since aggregate adoption of task type j equals $V_{j,t} - p$ in either market structure at an interior equilibrium,

$$\bar{x}_{j,t}^D - \bar{x}_{j,t}^M = p_t^M - p_t^D > 0 \qquad \text{for } j \in \{E, F\}.$$

This proves the first comparison.

Finally, combining (20) and (21),

$$\frac{1}{2}\left(\bar{x}_{E,t}^D + \bar{x}_{F,t}^D\right) = \frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t} - 2p_t^D}{2} < 2(p_t^M - m) = \bar{x}_{E,t}^M + \bar{x}_{F,t}^M.$$

Each duopolist therefore receives strictly less total data than a monopolist.

I now establish another important property that I use in part 2. Writing $S_t := V_{E,t} +$

$V_{F,t} - 2p_t^D > 0$, the candidate's pricing first-order condition gives

$$\frac{S_t}{2} = (p_t^D - m)\left(1 + \frac{S_t}{2\tau}\right) \implies p_t^D - m = \frac{\tau S_t}{2\tau + S_t} \in (0, \tau). \tag{22}$$

Part 2: Equilibrium existence and uniqueness.

(i) Existence.

Note that $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$ and suppress time subscripts going forward. By Part 1, $m < p^D < p^M < \min\{V_E, V_F\}$. Since $V_j \leq r_j < 1$, the candidate p^D induces interior adoption in both categories. Its first-order condition from Part 1 therefore satisfies

$$F'(p^D) = \frac{F(p^D)}{\tau} > 0.$$

Moreover, demand is untruncated on $[m, p^M]$, so F is strictly concave there, with $F'(p^M) = 0$. Recall that p^M globally maximizes F.

We show that (p^D, p^D) is an equilibrium. For a price cut $p = p^D - \delta \geq m$, (22) gives $0 < \delta \leq p^D - m < \tau$. The demand formula from Part 1 yields

$$\pi(p^D - \delta, p^D) = (p^D - m - \delta)\left[\frac{S}{2} + \delta\left(1 + \frac{S}{2\tau}\right) + \frac{\delta^2}{2\tau}\right].$$

Using (22),

$$\pi(p^D - \delta, p^D) - \pi(p^D, p^D) = \frac{\delta^2}{2\tau}\big(p^D - m - 2\tau - S - \delta\big) < 0.$$

Prices below m yield nonpositive profits and can be dismissed, since charging p^D against p^D yields strictly positive profits, $\pi(p^D, p^D) = F(p^D)/2 > 0$.

For a price increase $p = p^D + \delta$, where $0 < \delta < \tau$, only default users purchase from the deviating provider. The general demand formula gives

$$x_j(p^D + \delta, p^D) = \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - \frac{\delta}{\tau}\right) D(V_j - p^D - \delta),$$

and hence

$$\pi(p^D + \delta, p^D) = \frac{1}{2}\left(1 - \frac{\delta}{\tau}\right) F(p^D + \delta).$$

Concavity on $[p^D, p^M]$, global optimality of p^M, and $F'(p^D) > 0$ imply

$$F(p^D + \delta) \leq F(p^D) + F'(p^D)\delta$$

for every $\delta > 0$. Hence

$$\pi(p^D + \delta, p^D) \leq \frac{F(p^D)}{2}\left(1 - \frac{\delta^2}{\tau^2}\right) < \frac{F(p^D)}{2} = \pi(p^D, p^D).$$

Increases of at least τ yield zero demand. Thus no unilateral deviation is profitable, and (p^D, p^D) is an interior equilibrium.

(ii) Uniqueness.

Any symmetric equilibrium price must exceed m: prices below m yield negative profits, which can be avoided by pricing out of the market, while a small increase above m yields positive profits when the rival charges m. An equal price $p > p^M$ cannot be an equilibrium, since cutting to p^M yields at least $F(p^M)/2 \geq F(p)/2$, plus strictly positive profits from switching users. At $p = p^M$, the own-price derivative is $-F(p^M)/(2\tau) < 0$, so a small price cut is profitable.

Every symmetric equilibrium price therefore lies in (m, p^M). Since $p^M < \min\{V_E, V_F\}$ and $V_j \leq r_j < 1$, every such equilibrium is interior. Part 1 therefore implies that its price equals p^D, establishing uniqueness. ■

Proof of Proposition 3: Note that $\max\{r_E, r_F\} < 1$, which ensures that both task categories are at most partially automated. The additional conditions given in the proposition, together with the learning laws, yield:

$$V_{F,0} - m > (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_{E,0} + \rho_E v_E - m) \implies V_{F,1} - m > (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_{E,1} - m)$$

$$V_{F,0} - m < (\sqrt{2} + 1)(V_{E,0} - m) - \rho_F v_F \implies V_{F,1} - m < (\sqrt{2} + 1)(V_{E,1} - m)$$

These conditions ensure that the equilibrium is interior in the monopoly benchmark in periods 0 and 1, for any feasible $V_{E,1}$ and $V_{F,1}$. The first condition ensures that the monopolist would not find it optimal to exclude frontier tasks in either period (by Lemma 2), and the second condition ensures that the monopolist would not find it optimal to exclude established tasks. By Lemma 3, this implies that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under symmetric competition in periods 0 and 1, and that this equilibrium is interior. Suppose, as stated in the proposition, that the probability constraints are slack under both market structures. In the proof, set $t = 0$. At the common initial technological state, define

$$d := \frac{V_{E,t} + V_{F,t}}{2} - m, \qquad g := V_{E,t} - V_{F,t}, \qquad Q_\tau := \sqrt{d^2 + 4\tau^2}.$$

The comparative-advantage and monopoly-interiority assumptions imply $d > g > 0$.

Let $X_t^q := \bar{x}_{E,t}^q + \bar{x}_{F,t}^q$ for $q \in \{M, D\}$. The equilibrium-price formulas give $X_t^M = d$, and $X_t^D = d + Q_\tau - 2\tau$. In either market structure, $\bar{x}_{E,t}^q = \frac{X_t^q + g}{2}$, and $\bar{x}_{F,t}^q = \frac{X_t^q - g}{2}$.

Because each duopolist receives half of aggregate deployment, the respective increases in the average valuation d are

$$h^M = \frac{\rho_E v_E \bar{x}_{E,t}^M + \rho_F v_F \bar{x}_{F,t}^M}{2} = \frac{\Phi}{4}(d - \chi g),$$
$$h^D = \frac{\rho_E v_E \bar{x}_{E,t}^D + \rho_F v_F \bar{x}_{F,t}^D}{4} = \frac{\Phi}{8}\left(d - \chi g + Q_\tau - 2\tau\right).$$

Applying the equilibrium formulas at the resulting next-period technological states yields the exact adoption changes

$$\Delta X^M := X_{t+1}^M - X_t^M = h^M,$$
$$\Delta X^D := X_{t+1}^D - X_t^D = h^D + \sqrt{(d + h^D)^2 + 4\tau^2} - Q_\tau.$$

Subtracting and rationalizing gives

$$\Delta X^D - \Delta X^M = \frac{\Phi}{4} \frac{(Q_\tau - 2\tau)(Q_\tau + d + h^M) - (d - \chi g)(Q_\tau - d)}{\sqrt{(d + h^D)^2 + 4\tau^2} + Q_\tau + h^M - h^D}.$$

The denominator is strictly positive, since it exceeds $d + Q_\tau + h^M$. Therefore,

$$\Delta X^D > \Delta X^M \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad Q_\tau - 2\tau > \frac{(d - \chi g)(Q_\tau - d)}{Q_\tau + d + \frac{\Phi}{4}(d - \chi g)}. \tag{23}$$

The left-hand side of (23) is continuous and strictly decreasing in τ, from d as $\tau \downarrow 0$ to zero as $\tau \to \infty$. The right-hand side is continuous and strictly increasing in τ, from zero to $d - \chi g > 0$. Indeed, viewed as a function of Q_τ, the derivative of the right-hand side is

$$\frac{(d - \chi g)\left[2d + \frac{\Phi}{4}(d - \chi g)\right]}{\left[Q_\tau + d + \frac{\Phi}{4}(d - \chi g)\right]^2} > 0.$$

Thus the two sides cross exactly once, at a finite $\tau^* > 0$, and

$$\Delta X^D > \Delta X^M \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad \tau < \tau^*.$$

Finally, holding Φ, the current valuations, and marginal cost fixed, the derivative of the

right-hand side of (23) with respect to χ is

$$-\frac{g(Q_\tau - d)(Q_\tau + d)}{\left[Q_\tau + d + \frac{\Phi}{4}(d - \chi g)\right]^2} < 0 \qquad \text{for } \tau > 0.$$

Increasing χ therefore shifts the right-hand side downward without changing the left-hand side. The unique crossing moves strictly to the right, implying $\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial \chi} > 0$. ■

Proof of Proposition 4: Throughout, I omit the common factor 1/2 in profits that reflects the measure of each task category. Write $V_{j,t,k} := r - (1 - s_{j,t,k})v_j$ for provider k's valuation in category j, p_k for its price, and $D(x) := \min\{\max\{x, 0\}, 1\}$.

Demand. Fix a task category j, a provider k, and its rival o. A user whose default provider is k buys from k if and only if $\kappa \le V_{j,t,k} - p_k$ and $\sigma \ge V_{j,t,o} - p_o - V_{j,t,k} + p_k$. A user whose default provider is o buys from k if and only if $\sigma < V_{j,t,k} - p_k - V_{j,t,o} + p_o$ and $\kappa \le V_{j,t,k} - p_k - \sigma$. Hence

$$x_{j,k} = \frac{1}{2}\Bigg[D(V_{j,t,k} - p_k)\left(1 - \min\left\{\frac{\max\{V_{j,t,o} - p_o - V_{j,t,k} + p_k, 0\}}{\tau}, 1\right\}\right) + \frac{1}{\tau}\int_0^\tau \mathbf{1}\{\sigma < V_{j,t,k} - p_k - V_{j,t,o} + p_o\} D(V_{j,t,k} - p_k - \sigma)\, d\sigma \Bigg].$$

Two properties follow directly:

(D1)
$$x_{j,k} \le D^M(V_{j,t,k} - p_k) := \frac{1}{2}\left(D(V_{j,t,k} - p_k) + \frac{1}{\tau}\int_0^\tau D(V_{j,t,k} - p_k - \sigma)\, d\sigma \right),$$
the demand in the absence of the rival, with equality whenever $V_{j,t,o} - p_o \le \max\{0,\, V_{j,t,k} - p_k - \tau\}$.

(D2) $x_{j,k} = 0$ whenever $V_{j,t,k} - p_k \le \max\{0,\, V_{j,t,o} - p_o - \tau\}$.

For $u \in [0, 1]$,

$$D^M(u) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}\left(u + \frac{u^2}{2\tau}\right), & u \in [0, \tau], \\ u - \frac{\tau}{4}, & u \in [\tau, 1]. \end{cases}$$

Part 1: Existence of the specialization equilibrium.

Provider A is the leader in category F and provider B the leader in category E. Denote leader and laggard valuations by $V^L_{F,t} := V_{F,t,A}$, $V^\ell_{F,t} := V_{F,t,B}$, $V^L_{E,t} := V_{E,t,B}$, and $V^\ell_{E,t} := V_{E,t,A}$. At

$t = 0$, $V^L_{j,0} = V_{j,0} + \epsilon v_j$ and $V^\ell_{j,0} = V_{j,0} - \epsilon v_j$, so condition (9) is condition (C_0), where

$$(C_t): \qquad V^L_{j,t} - m \;\geq\; \tfrac{7}{4}\tau + 2\max\{V^\ell_{j,t} - m,\, 0\} \qquad \text{for } j \in \{E, F\}.$$

Fix a date t at which (C_t) holds and define $p^S_A := \frac{V^L_{F,t}+m-\tau/4}{2}$ and $p^S_B := \frac{V^L_{E,t}+m-\tau/4}{2}$. Since $V^L_{j,t} - m \geq \frac{7}{4}\tau$, both prices strictly exceed m.

Step 1 (laggards are inactive). Fix j, let L and ℓ denote its leader and laggard, and suppose the leader charges p^S_L. For every $p \geq m$, $V^\ell_{j,t} - p \;\leq\; \max\left\{0,\, (V^L_{j,t} - p^S_L) - \tau\right\}$. If $V^\ell_{j,t} \leq m$, the left-hand side is nonpositive. Otherwise,

$$(V^L_{j,t} - p^S_L) - (V^\ell_{j,t} - p) \;\geq\; V^L_{j,t} - p^S_L - V^\ell_{j,t} + m = \tfrac{1}{2}\left[(V^L_{j,t} - m) - 2(V^\ell_{j,t} - m)\right] + \tfrac{\tau}{8} \;\geq\; \tau$$

by (C_t). By (D2), the laggard thus sells nothing in category j at any price $p \geq m$. By (D1), the leader's demand at p^S_L is $D^M(V^L_{j,t} - p^S_L)$ whenever the laggard charges a price of at least m.

Step 2 (the leader's problem without a rival). Let $W := V^L_{j,t} - m$. By (C_t) and $V^L_{j,t} \leq r$, $W \in [\frac{7}{4}\tau,\, r - m]$, so $W < 1$ and $\tau < 1$. Write the leader's price as $p = V^L_{j,t} - u$. For $p \geq m$, i.e., $u \leq W$, its rival-free profit is $\Pi(u) := (W - u)D^M(u)$. This is zero for $u \leq 0$. On $[0, \tau]$,

$$\Pi'(u) = \tfrac{1}{2}\left[W + \tfrac{W}{\tau}u - 2u - \tfrac{3}{2\tau}u^2\right],$$

a concave function of u that equals $W/2 > 0$ at $u = 0$ and $W - \frac{7}{4}\tau \geq 0$ at $u = \tau$. Hence Π is strictly increasing on $[0, \tau]$. On $[\tau, W]$, $\Pi(u) = (W - u)(u - \tau/4)$ is strictly concave with maximizer $u^* = (W + \tau/4)/2$. Here $u^* \geq \tau$ because $W \geq \frac{7}{4}\tau$, and $u^* \leq W$ because $W \geq \tau/4$. Thus u^*, i.e., the price p^S_L, uniquely maximizes rival-free profit over $p \geq m$, with $\Pi(u^*) = \left(\frac{W-\tau/4}{2}\right)^2 > 0$.

Step 3 (best responses). Consider provider A when $p_B = p^S_B$. Any $p_A < m$ yields nonpositive profit. For $p_A \geq m$, Step 1 with $j = E$ implies $x_{E,A} = 0$, and (D1) implies $x_{F,A} \leq D^M(V^L_{F,t} - p_A)$. Hence A's profit is bounded above by its rival-free profit in category F, which Step 2 shows is maximized at p^S_A. At $p_A = p^S_A$, Step 1 with $j = F$, using $p^S_B > m$, implies equality in (D1), so the bound is attained. Therefore p^S_A is a best response to p^S_B. By the same argument, p^S_B is a best response to p^S_A. In this equilibrium $x_{E,A} = x_{F,B} = 0$, and

$$\bar{x}^S_{j,t} = D^M(u^*) = u^* - \tfrac{\tau}{4} = \frac{V^L_{j,t} - m - \tau/4}{2} \in (0, 1),$$

where positivity follows from $W > \tau/4$ and $\bar{x}^S_{j,t} < u^* \leq W < 1$.

Step 4 (all periods). Consider the path along which this equilibrium is played in every

period. Laggards receive no data in the categories in which they lag, and there is no drift, so $V^{\ell}_{j,t} = V^{\ell}_{j,0}$. Leaders' success probabilities are nondecreasing, so $V^{L}_{j,t} \geq V^{L}_{j,0}$. Hence (C_0) implies (C_t) for all $t \geq 0$, and Steps 1–3 apply in every period.

Part 2: Speed of automation.

Under asymmetric competition, slack probability constraints imply $V^{L}_{j,1} = V^{L}_{j,0} + \rho_j v_j \bar{x}^{S}_{j,0}$ and $V^{\ell}_{j,1} = V^{\ell}_{j,0}$. Applying Step 3 at dates 0 and 1,

$$\Delta X^S := \sum_{j\in\{E,F\}} \left(\bar{x}^{S}_{j,1} - \bar{x}^{S}_{j,0}\right) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j\in\{E,F\}} \rho_j v_j \, \bar{x}^{S}_{j,0}.$$

Under symmetric competition, Lemma 3 implies that, at a state with valuations (V_E, V_F) and $S := V_E + V_F$, an interior symmetric equilibrium has price $P(S) := p^M + \tau - \sqrt{(p^M - m)^2 + \tau^2}$, with $p^M := (S + 2m)/4$, and aggregate adoption $X(S) := S - 2P(S)$; this characterization does not depend on the ordering of V_E and V_F. Each provider serves half of all automated tasks. With slack probability constraints, $S_1 = S_0 + \frac{1}{2}\sum_j \rho_j v_j \bar{x}^{D}_{j,0}$, where $\bar{x}^{D}_{j,0} = V_{j,0} - p^{D}_{0}$. For $S \geq S_0$, the maintained restriction $m < V_{j,0}$ implies $p^M > m$, and hence

$$X'(S) = \frac{1}{2}\left(1 + \frac{p^M - m}{\sqrt{(p^M - m)^2 + \tau^2}}\right) \in \left(\tfrac{1}{2}, 1\right).$$

Since the symmetric equilibrium is interior at dates 0 and 1 and $S_1 > S_0$,

$$\Delta X^D := \sum_{j\in\{E,F\}} \left(\bar{x}^{D}_{j,1} - \bar{x}^{D}_{j,0}\right) = X(S_1) - X(S_0) < S_1 - S_0 = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{j\in\{E,F\}} \rho_j v_j \, \bar{x}^{D}_{j,0}.$$

Moreover, $\bar{x}^{S}_{j,0} - \bar{x}^{D}_{j,0} = \frac{1}{2}(\epsilon v_j - N_j)$ with $N_j := V_{j,0} - m - 2(p^{D}_{0} - m) + \tau/4$. Using $\rho_E v_E = \Phi(1-\chi)/2$ and $\rho_F v_F = \Phi(1+\chi)/2$,

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta X^S - \Delta X^D &> \frac{1}{4} \sum_{j\in\{E,F\}} \rho_j v_j (\epsilon v_j - N_j) \\
&= \frac{\Phi}{8}\Big[\big((1-\chi)v_E + (1+\chi)v_F\big)\epsilon - \big((1-\chi)N_E + (1+\chi)N_F\big)\Big].
\end{aligned}$$

Collecting the terms in χ, the bracket equals

$$\chi\Big[\epsilon(v_F - v_E) + (N_E - N_F)\Big] + \epsilon(v_E + v_F) - (N_E + N_F).$$

By the definition of N_j, $N_E - N_F = V_{E,0} - V_{F,0}$ and, since $V_{E,0} + V_{F,0} - 2m = 4(p_0^M - m)$, $N_E + N_F = 4(p_0^M - p_0^D) + \tau/2$. The coefficient on χ is strictly positive because $v_E < v_F$ and $V_{E,0} > V_{F,0}$. Hence the bracket is nonnegative if and only if $\chi \geq \bar{\chi}(\epsilon)$, in which case $\Delta X^S > \Delta X^D$. Since the aggregate automation share equals $\frac{1}{2}(\bar{x}_{E,t} + \bar{x}_{F,t})$ under both market structures, this proves the second statement. ■

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Pricing Intelligence: Task-Based Learning and Labor Displacement in the AI Economy

Online Appendix

Carl-Christian Groh

B Extensions **1**

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B Extensions

B.1 Alternative Pricing Schemes: Flat Fees

Model: There is a finite number of time periods $t \in \{0, \dots, T\}$. There is a unit mass of users, each of whom must complete a unit mass of tasks in each period. Each task can be completed using labor or AI. Tasks are either *established* or *frontier*. Users differ in the share of frontier tasks $\theta \in [0, 1]$ they have to complete, which is their private information. The distribution of frontier-task shares is denoted by F and admits a continuous density f. In each period, an AI provider chooses the price p_t at which users can purchase access to AI. When a user purchases access to AI, the user can utilize AI to complete all of its tasks.

If a user completes any task using labor, this yields a payoff of r. If a user completes an established task (respectively, frontier task) using AI in period t, this yields the benefit $b_{E,t}$ (respectively, $b_{F,t}$). Throughout this section, I assume $r < b_{F,t} < b_{E,t}$. This means that AI has the comparative advantage at established tasks, whereas labor has the comparative advantage at frontier tasks.

A user with frontier-task share θ has the following willingness to pay for access to AI:

$$V_t(\theta) = \theta \mathbb{1}[b_{F,t} > r](b_{F,t} - r) + (1 - \theta)\mathbb{1}[b_{E,t} > r](b_{E,t} - r). \tag{B.1}$$

When $r < b_{F,t} < b_{E,t}$, users' willingness to pay for access to AI is thus decreasing in their frontier-task share.

If users with $\theta \in [0, \bar{\theta}_t]$ purchase access to AI at the price p_t, the AI provider's profits are

$$\Pi_t = \int_0^{\bar{\theta}_t} \big(p_t - C(\theta)\big)\, dF(\theta), \tag{B.2}$$

where $C(\theta) = c_F\theta + c_E(1-\theta)$ represents the costs of serving a user with type θ. Intuitively, c_E and c_F can be viewed as the costs that accrue to the provider per established and frontier task, respectively, that a user completes using AI. I assume that $c_F \geq c_E$. Further, I specify that $b_{E,0} - c_E > r$ and $b_{F,0} - c_F > r$. These conditions imply that utilizing AI is socially efficient and ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which AI is sold.

The values of $b_{E,t}$ and $b_{F,t}$ evolve over time according to the following laws of motion:

$$b_{E,t+1} = b_{E,t} + \rho_E \int_0^{\bar{\theta}_t} (1-\theta)\, dF(\theta) \tag{B.3}$$

$$b_{F,t+1} = b_{F,t} + \rho_F \int_0^{\bar{\theta}_t} \theta\, dF(\theta). \tag{B.4}$$

The parameter ρ_E captures the efficiency of established-task learning, while the parameter ρ_F captures the efficiency of frontier-task learning. Intuitively, if ρ_E (respectively, ρ_F) is larger, then the extent to which the AI system becomes better at accomplishing established (respectively, frontier) tasks by completing such tasks is larger.

I assume that the AI provider maximizes profits in every period myopically, i.e., that it does not take into account how its choices affect its future profits through learning.

Analysis: Given that users' willingness to pay for AI is decreasing in their frontier-task share θ, there exists a $\bar{\theta}_t$ such that users purchase access to AI if and only if their frontier-task share is at most $\bar{\theta}_t$. The share of users purchasing access to AI is $F(\bar{\theta}_t)$. Because each user has a unit mass of tasks and uses AI for all of them upon purchasing access, this also equals the aggregate automation share. If $\theta \sim U[0,1]$, this share equals $\bar{\theta}_t$.

If $\rho_E > 0$, $\rho_F > 0$, and $\theta \sim U[0,1]$, the relative speed of learning on frontier versus established tasks is

$$\frac{b_{F,t+1} - b_{F,t}}{b_{E,t+1} - b_{E,t}} = \frac{\rho_F}{\rho_E} \frac{\bar{\theta}_t}{2 - \bar{\theta}_t}. \tag{B.5}$$

Thus, increases in $\bar{\theta}_t$ increase the relative speed of learning on frontier tasks. Intuitively, this

is because the AI provider obtains proportionally more data on frontier tasks when its user base contains more users with a relatively large share of frontier tasks.

The AI provider chooses its price in any period myopically, i.e., to maximize its profits in that period. Equivalently, it chooses the cutoff $\bar{\theta}_t$. I refer to the optimal value of this cutoff as $\bar{\theta}_t^M$. If interior, this cutoff is given by:

$$\bar{\theta}_t^M = \frac{b_{E,t} - r - c_E}{2(b_{E,t} - b_{F,t}) + (c_F - c_E)}. \tag{B.6}$$

The following lemma establishes how AI learning on different tasks affects this cutoff:

Lemma 4 (Optimal pricing)
Suppose $\theta \sim U[0,1]$. If $\bar{\theta}_t^M \in (0,1)$, then $\bar{\theta}_t^M$ is strictly increasing in $b_{F,t}$, whereas $\bar{\theta}_t^M$ is strictly decreasing in $b_{E,t}$.

If AI gets better at performing frontier tasks (increases in $b_{F,t}$), the valuations of users with a large share of frontier tasks increase relatively strongly. This incentivizes the AI provider to expand access, i.e., $\bar{\theta}_t^M$ increases. By contrast, improvements in the AI's capability to perform established tasks (increases in $b_{E,t}$) induce the provider to reduce access. Intuitively, this is because such changes induce relatively large increases in the valuations of users with a small share of frontier tasks. This makes it optimal to ration access more in order to extract more revenue from these users with comparatively high willingnesses to pay.

The economic forces I discussed imply that technological improvements in the capabilities of AI have differential effects on AI adoption and, by implication, AI-driven labor displacement. If AI improves at frontier tasks, this increases AI adoption. If AI improves at established tasks, this may reduce AI adoption because the provider optimally rations access to AI to extract more revenue from users that have a small share of frontier tasks and a high willingness to pay. Which of these effects dominates in the dynamic evolution of AI adoption and labor displacement depends on the relative efficiencies of established-task learning and frontier-task learning (as governed by the parameters ρ_E and ρ_F).

I formally characterize this by describing the evolution equation of the cutoff $\bar{\theta}_t^M$:

Proposition 5 (The speed and convexity of AI adoption)
Suppose $\theta \sim U[0,1]$. If $\bar{\theta}_t^M \in (0,1)$ and $\bar{\theta}_{t+1}^M \in (0,1)$, the evolution equation for $\bar{\theta}_t^M$ is:

$$\bar{\theta}_{t+1}^M - \bar{\theta}_t^M = \frac{\rho_E \bar{\theta}_t^M - (5/2)\rho_E(\bar{\theta}_t^M)^2 + (\rho_E + \rho_F)(\bar{\theta}_t^M)^3}{2(b_{E,t+1} - b_{F,t+1}) + (c_F - c_E)}. \tag{B.7}$$

If $\frac{\rho_F}{\rho_E} > \frac{9}{16}$, then:

- $\bar{\theta}_t^M$ *is weakly increasing over time, and strictly increasing if* $\bar{\theta}_t^M < 1$.
- *There exists a* $\beta \in (0,1)$ *such that, if* $\bar{\theta}_t^M > \beta$ *and the cutoffs remain interior, then* $\bar{\theta}_{t+2}^M - \bar{\theta}_{t+1}^M > \bar{\theta}_{t+1}^M - \bar{\theta}_t^M$.

This proposition establishes that, if the relative efficiency of frontier-task learning is relatively large (specifically, $\frac{\rho_F}{\rho_E} > \frac{9}{16}$), then (i) AI adoption increases over time and (ii) eventually increases convexly. The intuition underlying the first result is that, when the efficiency of frontier-task learning is relatively large, the adoption-expanding effect of increases in $b_{F,t}$ dominates. The path of AI adoption eventually becomes convex because this effect is self-reinforcing: When AI becomes more capable at frontier tasks, this expands AI adoption. In turn, this increases the relative speed of AI learning on frontier tasks, which feeds back positively into the speed at which AI adoption increases.

Importantly, however, it is also possible that AI adoption decreases over time if the relative efficiency of established-task learning is large. This illustrates a mechanism analogous to the baseline learning trap. To establish this, I set $c_E = 0.1$, $c_F = 0.2$, $r = 0.25$, $b_{F,0} = 0.75$, and $b_{E,0} = 1.5$. Further, I impose that $\rho_F = 0.01$ and $\rho_E = 0.05$, so established-task learning is relatively efficient. The following figure plots the resulting dynamic path of $\bar{\theta}_t^M$:




Figure B.1: AI adoption under flat fees

B.2 Multiple Qualities and Screening

Model: Time is discrete and indexed by t. In every period, a unit mass of users each have to complete a unit mass of tasks, equal shares of which are basic (indexed B), established (indexed E), and frontier (indexed F). Successfully completing a task of difficulty $j \in \{B, E, F\}$ yields the value $v_j > 0$ for a user.

A single AI provider sells access to two models, namely a legacy model (indexed L) and a next-generation model (indexed N). In every period t, the provider chooses the per-task

prices $p_{L,t}$ and $p_{N,t}$ which a user must pay when attempting to complete a task using the legacy model and the next-generation model, respectively. After observing these prices, every user decides, for each of her tasks, whether to attempt to complete the task using the legacy model, the next-generation model, or to complete the task using labor.

When a user hires labor to complete a task, it is completed successfully with probability one. The associated costs which accrue to the user are $r_j \in (0, \min\{1, v_j\})$, with $j \in \{B, E, F\}$. If a user purchases AI to complete a task, the AI may fail to complete it successfully. In that case, the user derives zero value from the task and cannot attempt to complete it again.

I define $s^q_{j,t} \in [0, 1]$ as the probability that a task with difficulty $j \in \{B, E, F\}$ is completed successfully when attempted by a model $q \in \{L, N\}$ at time t. I specify that both the legacy and the next-generation AI models successfully complete any basic task with probability one. I also impose that the legacy model never successfully completes frontier tasks. I now provide an overview of the success probabilities.

	Basic	Established	Frontier
Legacy AI	1	$s^L_{E,t}$	0
Next-Generation AI	1	$s^N_{E,t}$	$s^N_{F,t}$

Table 2: AI Models' Success Probabilities

I assume that the success probabilities match the inverse-S-shaped relationships between software task difficulty and the probability of successful completion documented by Kwa et al. (2026) for different AI models: Each model successfully completes basic tasks such as simple arithmetic problems with near certainty. By contrast, all models have success probabilities close to zero for tasks that are sufficiently far beyond the capability frontier. Thus, improvements in model quality generate small gains in the probability of successful completion for tasks at the lower and upper ends of the difficulty distribution. For tasks of intermediate difficulty such as debugging code, however, success probabilities are interior and improve substantially with model quality—this gives rise to the quality premia observed in real-world AI markets.

When a user completes a task with difficulty $j \in \{B, E, F\}$ using labor, this yields the net value $v_j - r_j$. A user's willingness to pay for purchasing an AI model of quality $q \in \{L, N\}$ to attempt a task with difficulty $j \in \{E, F\}$ in period t is thus

$$\underbrace{r_j - (1 - s^q_{j,t})v_j}_{:=V^q_{j,t}} - \kappa, \tag{B.8}$$

where $\kappa \sim U[0,1]$ is an independently drawn task-specific cost of AI adoption borne by the user (no matter which AI model completes the task), and $V_{j,t}^q$ is the gross willingness to pay for AI. Completing a basic task with AI incurs no adoption costs.

If a user utilizes a model $q \in \{L, N\}$ to complete a task of difficulty $j \in \{B, E, F\}$, this incurs a cost $m_j^q \geq 0$ to the AI provider. I assume $m_E^L = m_E^N := m_E \leq m_F^N$ and that the marginal costs of AI usage are below the gross willingness to pay, i.e., $m_B^L < r_B$, $m_E^L < V_{E,t}^L$, $m_E^N < V_{E,t}^N$, and $m_F^N < V_{F,t}^N$.

The profits that the provider obtains from established and frontier tasks in t are thus

$$\pi_t = \sum_{j \in \{E,F\}} \sum_{q \in \{L,N\}} \frac{1}{3}(p_{q,t} - m_j^q) x_{j,t}^q \tag{B.9}$$

where $x_{j,t}^q$ is the share of tasks in category j that users attempt using a model of quality q.

Throughout the analysis, I assume that the AI provider myopically maximizes its profits in every period. Further, I restrict attention to equilibria in which the price of the legacy model is below the price of the next-generation model, which is the empirically relevant case. For simplicity, I also assume that users' willingness to pay for automating basic tasks is relatively low, i.e., $r_B < \min\left\{V_{E,0}^L, \frac{1}{4} V_{E,0}^N\right\}$, but that the profit margin on these tasks is large enough to ensure that the provider always finds it optimal to serve basic tasks as well, so $p_{L,t} = r_B$ holds in equilibrium.

The next-generation model improves at accomplishing established and frontier tasks by being deployed to complete the respective tasks for users. Formally, the values of $s_{E,t}^N$ and $s_{F,t}^N$ evolve over time according to the following laws of motion:

$$s_{E,t+1}^N = \min\{s_{E,t}^N + \rho_E x_{E,t}^N, 1\} \quad ; \quad s_{F,t+1}^N = \min\{s_{F,t}^N + \rho_F x_{F,t}^N, 1\}. \tag{B.10}$$

The parameter $\rho_E > 0$ captures the efficiency of established-task learning, and the parameter $\rho_F > 0$ captures the efficiency of frontier-task learning. I assume that $s_{E,t}^L = s_E^L$ holds for all t, i.e., that the legacy model's capabilities do not improve—this is in line with the fact that improvements in real-world AI models are usually concentrated in the newest models. As a result, the valuation $V_{E,t}^L$ stays constant over time, so $V_{E,t}^L := V_E^L$ holds for all t.

Throughout the formal analysis, I restrict attention to settings where $s_{F,t}^N$ is small enough that $V_{E,t}^N > V_{E,t}^N - V_E^L > V_{F,t}^N$. In particular, I assume this holds at $t = 0$.

Analysis: If the legacy model is sufficiently weak at established tasks, the analysis is equivalent to the baseline analysis because the market for basic tasks and the market for established and frontier tasks are segmented. If the legacy model's capabilities on estab-

lished tasks are sufficiently strong, there is a screening constraint that influences the optimal pricing: Users could use the legacy model to complete established tasks, which limits the revenue the provider can extract from such tasks. This makes equilibria where frontier tasks are excluded more difficult to sustain.

I begin by characterizing the possible equilibria that can emerge. As before, the provider optimally sets a price at which users do not automate frontier tasks if AI's comparative disadvantage at frontier tasks is sufficiently large, and vice versa:

Proposition 6 (Legacy model and frontier inclusion)
Fix the technological state. There are three candidates for an equilibrium:

- *An equilibrium with partial automation of established and frontier tasks.*
- *An equilibrium where frontier tasks are not automated and users are indifferent between attempting established tasks with the next-generation and the legacy model.*
- *An equilibrium where frontier tasks are not automated and users strictly prefer to attempt established tasks with the next-generation rather than the legacy model.*

There exists a threshold $\hat{V}_{F,t}$ such that no frontier tasks are automated if $V_{F,t}^N < \hat{V}_{F,t}$, whereas both established and frontier tasks are partially automated by the next-generation model if $V_{F,t}^N > \hat{V}_{F,t}$. If $2(V_E^L - r_B) \leq V_{E,t}^N - m_E$, this threshold is as in the baseline analysis. If $2(V_E^L - r_B) > V_{E,t}^N - m_E$, the threshold is weakly lower than in the baseline analysis and weakly decreasing in $V_E^L - r_B$.

The key mechanisms from the baseline analysis extend. Frontier-task learning makes the exclusion of these tasks less valuable, whereas established-task learning makes the exclusion of frontier tasks more profitable because it raises users' willingness to pay for completing established tasks using the next-generation model.

B.3 Dynamic Optimization

Model: I now consider an infinite-horizon version of the monopoly benchmark in which the provider is forward-looking and discounts future profits with discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$. For tractability, I impose $r_E = r_F = r < 1$ and $m_E = m_F = 0$. The success probabilities of the AI model on established and frontier tasks in period t are denoted by $s_{E,t}$ and $s_{F,t}$.

Let $V_j(s_{j,t}) = r - (1 - s_{j,t})v_j$ denote users' gross willingness to pay for automating tasks in category $j \in \{E, F\}$ when the AI's success probability in the task category is $s_{j,t}$. When the price of the AI model is p, the share of such tasks attempted using AI is

$x_j(s_{j,t}, p) = \max\{0, V_j(s_{j,t}) - p\}$, which lies below one because $r < 1$. The provider's value function W solves

$$W(s_E, s_F) = \max_{p \in [0,r]} \left\{ \tfrac{1}{2}\, p \left[x_E(s_E, p) + x_F(s_F, p) \right] + \beta\, W(s'_E, s'_F) \right\}, \tag{B.11}$$

with $s'_j = \min\{1,\, s_j + \rho_j\, x_j(s_j, p) + \lambda_j\}$ for both $j \in \{E, F\}$. As before, I refer to the automation shares in each task category as $\bar{x}_{j,t}$.

The restriction $p \leq r$ is without loss, since no user adopts at higher prices. The restriction $p \geq 0$ rules out paying users for purchasing AI, which would be at odds with empirical reality. Note that the state space $[0,1]^2$ is compact, the action set is compact, and the state transition equation as well as flow profits are continuous. Hence, the Bellman operator is a contraction on the space of continuous functions on $[0,1]^2$. Thus, there is a unique continuous value function, the maximum is attained in every state, and the optimal policy correspondence is nonempty and upper hemicontinuous. I refer to any sequence of states and prices generated by a selection from this correspondence as an *optimal path*.

Analysis: A forward-looking provider internalizes that deploying AI on frontier tasks raises users' future willingness to pay for automating them, which strengthens its incentive to serve them. One might hence expect forward-looking pricing to eliminate the learning trap. The next result shows that it does not: As in the baseline analysis, a learning trap emerges if the initial frontier-task success probability and the efficiency of frontier-task learning are small enough.

Proposition 7 (Learning trap under forward-looking pricing) *Suppose* $\lambda_E = \lambda_F = 0$, $V_E(s_{E,0}) > 0$, *and* $V_F(s_{F,0}) < \min\{V_E(s_{E,0}), (\sqrt{2} - 1)\, r\}$. *Then:*

- *For every* $\rho_E > 0$, *there is a* $\bar{\rho}_F > 0$ *such that, for all* $\rho_F \in (0, \bar{\rho}_F)$ *and along every optimal path of the forward-looking provider, there is a finite* T^* *such that, for all* $t \geq T^*$, $s_{E,t} = 1$, *the unique optimal price of AI is* $p_t^* = r/2$, *and* $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$.
- *If, in addition,* $V_F(s_{F,0}) > (\sqrt{2} - 1)\, V_E(s_{E,0})$, *then* $\bar{x}_{F,0} > 0$ *for every optimal path.*

Intuitively, a learning trap emerges as follows: established tasks are never priced out of AI adoption, so established-task learning proceeds and the success probability $s_{E,t}$ eventually reaches one. If frontier-task learning is sufficiently inefficient, the success probability on frontier tasks is still low when established-task learning is complete. Serving frontier tasks then requires a discrete price cut that entails a first-order loss in current profits from established tasks, whereas the resulting future gains from frontier-task learning are small because

frontier-task learning is inefficient. The provider therefore excludes frontier tasks. Because excluded tasks generate no learning, the state does not change, the provider faces the same trade-off in every subsequent period, and frontier-task adoption remains zero forever. As formalized in the second result of Proposition 7, this can occur even if frontier tasks are initially automated.

I now establish conditions which guarantee that AI adoption initially increases slowly and then rapidly:

Proposition 8 (Learning takeoff under forward-looking pricing) *Assume* $\rho_F = 0$, $\lambda_E = 0$, *and* $\lambda_F > 0$. *Suppose further that* $V_F(s_{F,0}) > 0$ *and*

$$\max\left\{(1+\sqrt{2})\, V_F(s_{F,0}),\ \left(1+\tfrac{\sqrt{2}}{2}\right) v_F\, \lambda_F\right\} < V_E(s_{E,0}). \tag{B.12}$$

Then:

- *There is a* $\bar{\rho}_E > 0$ *such that, for all* $\rho_E \in (0, \bar{\rho}_E)$ *and along every optimal path, there is a finite* $T_s \geq 1$ *such that* $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$ *for all* $t < T_s$ *and* $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ *for all* $t \geq T_s$. *Further,* $\bar{x}_{E,T_s} > \bar{x}_{E,T_s-1}$.
- *Adoption is nearly flat before the switch, i.e.,* $\sup_{t<T_s} \left|\bar{x}_{E,t} - V_E(s_{E,0})/2\right| \to 0$ *as* $\rho_E \to 0$, *uniformly over optimal paths.*

Intuitively, condition (B.12) states that AI's comparative disadvantage on frontier tasks is initially large.[22] Because technological drift is gradual, it remains large in the initial periods, so the provider targets established tasks with a high price that excludes frontier tasks. Adoption is then limited to established tasks and grows only slowly. Drift gradually raises users' willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks. Eventually, there is a regime switch and some frontier tasks are automated. The associated reduction in the AI price also expands adoption on established tasks, so established-task learning accelerates. Hence, the complementarity between frontier-task and established-task adoption extends to forward-looking pricing.

B.4 Compute Constraints

Model: In this section, I consider a variant of the baseline model with a compute constraint: Specifically, the AI provider can complete at most a measure $\bar{K}_t$ of tasks using the AI model in period t, where $\bar{K}_t$ can evolve over time. Formally, $\frac{1}{2}\bar{x}_{E,t} + \frac{1}{2}\bar{x}_{F,t} \leq \bar{K}_t$ must hold. I say

[22] The bound on λ_F ensures that AI retains its comparative advantage on established tasks at the regime switch.

that the compute constraint is relevant if the unconstrained optimal allocation violates the constraint. For simplicity, I assume $r_E = r_F = r < 1$ throughout this analysis. Everything else is as in the baseline model.

Analysis: I now state the main result of this extension, which formalizes that compute constraints tilt AI deployment toward established tasks. As established in the baseline analysis, this can slow down AI adoption through several channels.

Proposition 9 (Compute constraints)
Fix the technological state in period t. Suppose $\bar{K}_t > 0$ and $V_{F,t} < V_{E,t}$. If $V_{F,t} - m_F < (\sqrt{2}-1)(V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F)$ in period t, no frontier tasks are automated. If $V_{F,t} - m_F > (\sqrt{2}-1)(V_{E,t} + m_E - 2m_F)$ in period t and the compute constraint is relevant, then either

- *No frontier tasks are automated, whereas some frontier tasks are automated in the absence of a compute constraint.*
- *Some frontier tasks are automated, but the ratio $\frac{\bar{x}_{E,t}}{\bar{x}_{F,t}}$ is strictly higher than in the absence of a compute constraint.*

A compute constraint thus tilts AI deployment toward established tasks. If no frontier tasks are automated in the absence of a compute constraint, this remains true when a compute constraint is introduced.[23] Even if some frontier tasks are automated both with and without a relevant compute constraint, the composition of deployment shifts toward established tasks. Intuitively, established-task users have systematically higher willingness to pay for AI. A relevant compute constraint raises the equilibrium price and therefore disproportionately selects established-task users with high willingness to pay.[24]

C Proofs: Extensions

Proof of Lemma 4: Fix a period t and suppress the time subscript. Since willingness to pay is decreasing in θ, a cutoff $\bar{\theta}$ can be implemented by setting the price equal to the willingness to pay of the marginal user, i.e., $p(\bar{\theta}) = b_E - r - \bar{\theta}(b_E - b_F)$. Using $C(\theta) =$

[23] If there is a relevant compute constraint, the equilibrium price is weakly higher than in the unconstrained equilibrium. Since the unconstrained price already exceeds users' gross willingness to pay for automating frontier tasks, frontier tasks remain excluded.

[24] The same mechanism extends beyond the uniform distribution. For example, it holds when task-specific adoption costs follow a common normal distribution.

$c_E + (c_F - c_E)\theta$, the provider's profit as a function of the cutoff is

$$\Pi(\bar{\theta}) = \int_0^{\bar{\theta}} \left[p(\bar{\theta}) - C(\theta)\right] d\theta = (b_E - r - c_E)\bar{\theta} - \left[b_E - b_F + \frac{c_F - c_E}{2}\right] \bar{\theta}^2. \tag{C.1}$$

Under the maintained assumptions $b_E > b_F$ and $c_F \geq c_E$, this objective is strictly concave in $\bar{\theta}$. The first-order condition for an interior optimum is

$$b_E - r - c_E - [2(b_E - b_F) + (c_F - c_E)]\,\bar{\theta} = 0. \tag{C.2}$$

Consequently, the optimal monopoly cutoff is

$$\bar{\theta}^M = \frac{b_E - r - c_E}{2(b_E - b_F) + (c_F - c_E)}, \tag{C.3}$$

if interior. Note that $b_E - r - c_E > 0$, which implies that this cutoff is positive. Differentiating (C.3) with respect to b_F gives

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}^M}{\partial b_F} = \frac{2(b_E - r - c_E)}{\left[2(b_E - b_F) + (c_F - c_E)\right]^2} > 0, \tag{C.4}$$

where the inequality follows from the interiority of $\bar{\theta}^M$. Similarly,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}^M}{\partial b_E} = \frac{2(b_E - b_F) + (c_F - c_E) - 2(b_E - r - c_E)}{\left[2(b_E - b_F) + (c_F - c_E)\right]^2} = \frac{c_F + c_E - 2(b_F - r)}{\left[2(b_E - b_F) + (c_F - c_E)\right]^2}. \tag{C.5}$$

It follows that

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}^M}{\partial b_E} < 0 \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad \frac{c_F + c_E}{2} < b_F - r. \tag{C.6}$$

The latter inequality holds by the assumptions that $c_E \leq c_F$ and $c_F < b_F - r$. ■

Proof of Proposition 5: For brevity, define $x_t \equiv \bar{\theta}_t^M$, $A_t \equiv b_{E,t} - r - c_E$, and $D_t \equiv 2(b_{E,t} - b_{F,t}) + (c_F - c_E)$. By Lemma 4, the interior monopoly cutoff satisfies

$$x_t = \frac{A_t}{D_t}. \tag{C.7}$$

The maintained assumptions imply that $D_t > 0$ at every date under consideration.

Given a cutoff x_t, the learning equations under the uniform distribution are

$$b_{E,t+1} - b_{E,t} = \rho_E \int_0^{x_t} (1-\theta)\, d\theta = \rho_E \left(x_t - \frac{x_t^2}{2} \right), \tag{C.8}$$

$$b_{F,t+1} - b_{F,t} = \rho_F \int_0^{x_t} \theta\, d\theta = \frac{\rho_F}{2} x_t^2. \tag{C.9}$$

Consequently,

$$A_{t+1} = A_t + \rho_E \left(x_t - \frac{x_t^2}{2} \right), \tag{C.10}$$

$$D_{t+1} = D_t + 2\rho_E x_t - (\rho_E + \rho_F) x_t^2. \tag{C.11}$$

Suppose $x_t \in (0,1)$ and $x_{t+1} \in (0,1)$. Using $A_t = x_t D_t$, it follows that

$$x_{t+1} - x_t = \frac{A_{t+1}}{D_{t+1}} - x_t = \frac{\rho_E x_t - \frac{5}{2}\rho_E x_t^2 + (\rho_E + \rho_F) x_t^3}{D_{t+1}}. \tag{C.12}$$

Substituting the definition of D_{t+1} establishes the stated evolution equation.

We next establish monotonicity. Since the proposition refers to the ratio ρ_F/ρ_E, suppose $\rho_E > 0$ and define $q \equiv \frac{\rho_F}{\rho_E}$. Let

$$N(x) \equiv \rho_E x - \frac{5}{2}\rho_E x^2 + (\rho_E + \rho_F) x^3 = \rho_E x \left[1 - \frac{5}{2} x + (1+q) x^2 \right]. \tag{C.13}$$

The discriminant of the quadratic expression in brackets is $\left(\frac{5}{2}\right)^2 - 4(1+q) = \frac{9}{4} - 4q$. If $q > 9/16$, this discriminant is strictly negative. Since the coefficient on x^2 is positive, the quadratic expression is strictly positive for every $x \in \mathbb{R}$. Therefore, $N(x_t) > 0$ whenever $x_t \in (0,1)$. Since $D_{t+1} > 0$, it follows that $x_{t+1} > x_t$ for as long as the cutoffs remain interior.

At any date, strict concavity and $A_t > 0$ imply that the constrained optimal cutoff is $x_t = \min\{1, A_t/D_t\}$. Hence, if $x_t < 1$ and x_{t+1} lies at the boundary, then $x_{t+1} = 1 > x_t$, since $A_{t+1} > 0$ rules out a zero cutoff. If $x_t = 1$, then $A_t \geq D_t$. Evaluating (C.10) and (C.11) at $x_t = 1$ gives

$$A_{t+1} - D_{t+1} = A_t - D_t + \rho_F - \frac{\rho_E}{2} \geq \rho_E \left(q - \frac{1}{2} \right) > 0,$$

where the strict inequality follows from $q > 9/16 > 1/2$. Since $D_{t+1} > 0$, it follows that $A_{t+1}/D_{t+1} > 1$, so $x_{t+1} = 1$. Thus, the cutoff is weakly increasing over time and strictly increasing whenever $x_t < 1$.

It remains to establish convexity once the cutoff is sufficiently high. For this argument, suppose $x_t \in (0,1)$, $x_{t+1} \in (0,1)$, and $x_{t+2} \in (0,1)$. Define $H(x) \equiv 2\rho_E x - (\rho_E + \rho_F)x^2$, so that, by (C.11), $D_{t+1} = D_t + H(x_t)$. Also define

$$\Delta_t \equiv x_{t+1} - x_t = \frac{N(x_t)}{D_{t+1}}. \tag{C.14}$$

Write $x \equiv x_t$, and $y \equiv x_{t+1}$. By the monotonicity result, $y > x$. Moreover, $D_{t+2} = D_{t+1} + H(y)$. Hence,

$$\Delta_{t+1} > \Delta_t \iff \frac{N(y)}{D_{t+1} + H(y)} > \frac{N(x)}{D_{t+1}} \tag{C.15}$$

$$\iff \big[N(y) - N(x)\big] D_{t+1} > N(x)H(y). \tag{C.16}$$

Because $y - x = \Delta_t = \frac{N(x)}{D_{t+1}} > 0$, the preceding condition is equivalent to

$$\frac{N(y) - N(x)}{y - x} > H(y). \tag{C.17}$$

By the mean-value theorem, there exists some $\xi \in (x, y)$ such that $\frac{N(y)-N(x)}{y-x} = N'(\xi)$. Now, $N'(u) = \rho_E - 5\rho_E u + 3(\rho_E + \rho_F)u^2$. At $u = 1$,

$$N'(1) - H(1) = (-\rho_E + 3\rho_F) - (\rho_E - \rho_F) = 2\rho_E(2q - 1). \tag{C.18}$$

Since $q > 9/16 > 1/2$, this expression is strictly positive.

Define $G(u, v) \equiv N'(u) - H(v)$. The function G is continuous and satisfies $G(1, 1) > 0$. Therefore, there exists a $\beta \in (0, 1)$ such that $N'(u) > H(v)$ for all $u, v \in (\beta, 1)$.

Suppose now that $x_t > \beta$ and that the cutoffs at dates t, $t + 1$, and $t + 2$ remain interior. Since $x_{t+1} > x_t$, both x_{t+1} and the mean-value-theorem point $\xi \in (x_t, x_{t+1})$ belong to $(\beta, 1)$. It follows that $\frac{N(x_{t+1})-N(x_t)}{x_{t+1}-x_t} = N'(\xi) > H(x_{t+1})$. By equation (C.17), $x_{t+2} - x_{t+1} > x_{t+1} - x_t$.

Finally, because the cutoff is increasing over time, once it exceeds β, all subsequent interior cutoffs also exceed β. The same argument can therefore be applied in every subsequent period for which the cutoffs remain interior. Restoring $x_t = \bar{\theta}_t^M$ establishes the result. ■

Proof of Proposition 6: Suppress the time index and write $V_E := V_{E,t}^N$, $V_F := V_{F,t}^N$, $m_F := m_F^N$, $\Delta := V_E - V_E^L$, and $\bar{p} := r_B + \Delta$. Since next-generation capabilities are nondecreasing over time, the initial restriction on r_B implies

$$0 < r_B < \min\{V_E^L, V_E/4\}.$$

Thus, the maintained assumptions give

$$0 \leq m_E \leq m_F < V_F < \Delta < \bar{p} < V_E < 1.$$

We maintain the model's restriction that serving basic tasks is optimal and $p_L = r_B < p_N$. All price comparisons below are conditional on this regime. As in the baseline analysis, an indifferent provider selects an optimal allocation serving frontier tasks.

Step 1 (demand and the conditional pricing problem). Both models complete basic tasks with certainty and without adoption costs. The restriction $p_L < p_N$ therefore makes the legacy model strictly preferable to the next-generation model for basic tasks. Under the maintained basic-service assumption, these tasks are served at $p_L = r_B$ and contribute the constant profit $(r_B - m_B^L)/3$. Consequently, keeping $p_L = r_B$, price ordering restricts the remaining maximization to $p_N > r_B$, throughout which basic-task profits are constant and can be omitted. In the remaining nonbasic-profit comparisons, also omit the factor $1/3$.

Since $V_F^L = r_F - v_F < 0$, frontier tasks are never attempted using the legacy model. They are attempted using the next-generation model iff $\kappa \leq V_F - p_N$. For established tasks, the payoff gains relative to labor from the two AI models are

$$V_E - p_N - \kappa \quad \text{and} \quad V_E^L - r_B - \kappa,$$

respectively. Hence a user weakly prefers the next-generation model to the legacy model iff $p_N \leq \bar{p}$. If $p_N < \bar{p}$, she uses the next-generation model iff $\kappa \leq V_E - p_N$; if $p_N > \bar{p}$, she uses the legacy model iff $\kappa \leq V_E^L - r_B$. Adoption-versus-labor ties have measure zero for these task categories and do not affect their shares.

Let $\ell := V_E^L - r_B > 0$. At $p_N = \bar{p}$, established-task adopters are indifferent between the two models. If a positive share a of these tasks were assigned to the legacy model, a sufficiently small cut to $\bar{p} - \varepsilon$ would make all these users strictly prefer the next-generation model. Choose $\varepsilon < \min\{\Delta, \bar{p} - V_F\}$, so basic tasks remain with the legacy model and frontier tasks remain unautomated. Because established-task costs are equal across models, the profit gain converges to $\Delta a > 0$ as $\varepsilon \downarrow 0$. Thus, an equilibrium at $p_N = \bar{p}$ must assign all established-task adopters to the next-generation model. This allocation is also an individually optimal choice for those users.

Prices $p_N > \bar{p}$ cannot be optimal either. Such a price generates nonbasic-task profit $(r_B - m_E)\ell$. A deviation to $\bar{p} - \varepsilon$, with ε as above and sufficiently small, generates nonbasic-task profit converging to

$$(\bar{p} - m_E)\ell = (r_B - m_E)\ell + \Delta\ell > (r_B - m_E)\ell.$$

This argument uses strict preferences after the deviation and does not require a tie-breaking assumption at an off-equilibrium price.

It follows that equilibrium candidates satisfy $r_B < p_N \leq \bar{p}$ and allocate established-task AI adoption to the next-generation model. Their normalized nonbasic-task profits are therefore

$$\pi(p_N) = (p_N - m_E)(V_E - p_N) + (p_N - m_F)(V_F - p_N)^+,$$

where $z^+ := \max\{z, 0\}$. No positive part is needed on established-task demand because $p_N \leq \bar{p} < V_E$. The upper truncation never binds for established or frontier tasks because their gross valuations are below one and prices are nonnegative.

Prices $p_N \leq m_E$ yield nonpositive nonbasic-task profits, whereas a price just below $\bar{p}$ yields positive profits. Hence an optimal candidate must also satisfy $p_N > m_E$. Set $a_0 := \max\{m_E, r_B\}$. The expression for π has a continuous extension to the compact interval $[a_0, \bar{p}]$. If $a_0 = r_B$, its value at that endpoint is only the continuous extension of the conditional objective, not a claim about basic-task choices when the two model prices coincide. Step 2 shows that no maximizer lies at this endpoint, so the strict price-ordering restriction is respected.

Step 2 (candidates and feasibility). Write

$$g(p) := (p - m_E)(V_E - p) + (p - m_F)(V_F - p)$$

for the joint-service branch, $p < V_F$, and

$$h(p) := (p - m_E)(V_E - p)$$

for the exclusion branch, $p \geq V_F$. Both are strictly concave, with unconstrained maximizers

$$p^{EF} = \frac{1}{4}(V_E + V_F + m_E + m_F), \qquad p^E = \frac{1}{2}(V_E + m_E).$$

Both stationary prices strictly exceed m_E. Moreover,

$$p^{EF} > V_E/4 > r_B, \qquad p^E \geq V_E/2 > r_B, \qquad \bar{p} > r_B.$$

If $a_0 = m_E$, its nonpositive profit rules it out. If $a_0 = r_B > m_E$, the relevant smooth branch is strictly increasing immediately to its right, since both stationary prices exceed r_B. This also holds when $r_B = V_F$, using the right-hand exclusion branch. Thus no maximizer of the continuous extension lies at a_0.

At $p = V_F$, whenever this kink lies in the interior of the price interval, the left derivative is

$h'(V_F) - (V_F - m_F)$ and the right derivative is $h'(V_F)$. The upward derivative jump rules out a maximum there. A maximizer therefore exists in $(a_0, \bar{p}]$ and is either p^{EF}, which requires $p^{EF} < V_F$, or the maximizer of h on the feasible exclusion branch. When $p^E \geq V_F$, the latter is $\min\{p^E, \bar{p}\}$.

The joint-service candidate partially automates both task categories. Under exclusion, established-task adopters strictly prefer the next-generation model if $p^E < \bar{p}$ and are indifferent between the models if $p^E \geq \bar{p}$. These are the three candidates. If $p^E < V_F$, the exclusion branch is decreasing, its lower endpoint cannot maximize overall profits, and the optimum lies below V_F. Both categories are then partially automated. Every candidate that can maximize profits satisfies $p_N > r_B = p_L$, as required.

Step 3 (threshold). Fix all primitives except V_F and consider the admissible domain $D := (m_F, \Delta)$. Define

$$\Pi^X := h(\min\{p^E, \bar{p}\}),$$

which does not depend on V_F. By Step 2, both categories are automated whenever $V_F > p^E$. For $V_F \leq p^E$, exclusion is feasible with value Π^X, and joint service obtains iff

$$p^{EF} < V_F \quad \text{and} \quad g(p^{EF}) \geq \Pi^X.$$

The first condition is equivalent to

$$V_F > \underline{V} := \frac{1}{3}(V_E + m_E + m_F).$$

By the envelope theorem,

$$\frac{\partial g(p^{EF})}{\partial V_F} = p^{EF} - m_F.$$

For $V_F \leq p^E$, this derivative is strictly positive because

$$p^{EF} = \frac{1}{4}(2p^E + V_F + m_F) \geq \frac{1}{4}(3V_F + m_F) > m_F.$$

Thus, the joint-service conditions become weakly easier to satisfy as V_F rises up to p^E; above p^E, joint service obtains throughout. The inclusion set

$$\mathcal{I} := \{V_F \in D : \text{both categories are automated}\}$$

is therefore an upper interval. Define

$$\hat{V}_F := \begin{cases} \inf \mathcal{I}, & \mathcal{I} \neq \varnothing, \\ \Delta, & \mathcal{I} = \varnothing. \end{cases}$$

In particular, $\hat{V}_F = m_F$ if every admissible valuation induces inclusion. This establishes the threshold characterization, including empty and full inclusion sets.

Step 4 (baseline comparison and comparative statics). Let

$$\hat{V}_F^0 := m_F + (\sqrt{2} - 1)(V_E + m_E - 2m_F)$$

be the unrestricted baseline inclusion cutoff. The baseline equilibrium characterization gives the threshold on the same admissible domain D as

$$T_F^0 := \min\{\Delta, \max\{m_F, \hat{V}_F^0\}\}.$$

If $2(V_E^L - r_B) \leq V_E - m_E$, then $p^E \leq \bar{p}$. A baseline exclusion optimum at p^E remains feasible under screening. A baseline joint-service optimum also remains feasible, since $r_B < p^{EF} < V_F < \Delta < \bar{p}$. Thus screening leaves the baseline optimum and inclusion set unchanged, so $\hat{V}_F = T_F^0$.

If $2(V_E^L - r_B) > V_E - m_E$, then $\bar{p} < p^E$, and every admissible frontier valuation satisfies $V_F < \Delta < \bar{p} < p^E$. The best exclusion profit is

$$\Pi^X = h(\bar{p}) < h(p^E),$$

because h is strictly increasing below p^E. Every baseline joint-service optimum remains feasible under screening and yields the same payoff. Hence every admissible valuation inducing inclusion in the baseline also induces inclusion under screening. The screening inclusion set weakly contains the baseline inclusion set, implying $\hat{V}_F \leq T_F^0$, including when either inclusion set is empty or full. No interior profit crossing is required.

Finally, let $\ell := V_E^L - r_B$, so that $\bar{p} = V_E - \ell$. Holding V_E, m_E, m_F fixed, the exclusion benchmark is

$$\Pi^X(\ell) = h\big(\min\{p^E, V_E - \ell\}\big).$$

It is constant while $\bar{p} \geq p^E$ and strictly decreases as $\bar{p}$ falls below p^E. The joint-service candidate's payoff and admissibility condition do not depend on ℓ.

At fixed V_E^L, lowering r_B keeps Δ fixed and weakly expands inclusion on the fixed admissible domain, so the threshold weakly decreases. At fixed r_B, increasing V_E^L also reduces Δ.

Inclusion weakly expands on the common admissible domain. If the new upper endpoint is no greater than the old threshold, the new threshold is bounded above by that endpoint and hence cannot exceed the old threshold. Otherwise, inclusion-set expansion on the common domain gives the same conclusion. Thus increasing V_E^L or decreasing r_B, holding the other primitives fixed and maintaining the model's restrictions, weakly decreases the threshold. Restoring the time indices establishes the result. ■

Proof of Proposition 7: Let $S = [0,1]^2$, $P = [0,r]$, $u(s,p) = \frac{1}{2}\,p\,[x_E(s_E,p) + x_F(s_F,p)]$, and

$$\phi_\rho(s,p) = \big(\min\{1, s_E + \rho_E x_E(s_E,p)\},\ \min\{1, s_F + \rho_F x_F(s_F,p)\}\big), \qquad \rho = (\rho_E,\rho_F) \geq 0.$$

Recall $v_E, v_F > 0$. Since $x_j \geq 0$, ϕ_ρ maps $S \times P$ into S.

Step 0 (Existence). The functions u and ϕ_ρ are continuous, u is bounded, and P is compact. By Berge's theorem, the Bellman operator $(B_\rho W)(s) = \max_{p\in P}\{u(s,p) + \beta W(\phi_\rho(s,p))\}$ maps $C(S)$ into $C(S)$, and the policy correspondence $G_\rho(s) = \arg\max_{p\in P}\{u(s,p) + \beta W_\rho(\phi_\rho(s,p))\}$ is nonempty and compact-valued. B_ρ satisfies Blackwell's monotonicity and discounting conditions, so it is a contraction with modulus β on the complete space $C(S)$. Hence it has a unique fixed point $W_\rho \in C(S)$. By standard arguments, W_ρ is the value of the sequential problem, and a price sequence is optimal if and only if $p_t \in G_\rho(s_t)$ for all t; optimal paths as defined above are therefore exactly the solutions of the sequential problem.

To establish continuity in ρ, note that $\|W_\rho - W_{\rho'}\| \leq \|B_\rho W_{\rho'} - B_{\rho'} W_{\rho'}\|/(1-\beta)$. Since $x_j \leq r < 1$, we have $\|\phi_\rho - \phi_{\rho'}\| \leq \|\rho - \rho'\|$, and $W_{\rho'}$ is uniformly continuous on S. Hence the right-hand side vanishes as $\rho \to \rho'$, and $(s,\rho) \mapsto W_\rho(s)$ is jointly continuous. Thus $F_\rho(s,p) := u(s,p) + \beta W_\rho(\phi_\rho(s,p))$ is jointly continuous in (s,p,ρ). Consequently, if $(s_n,\rho_n) \to (s,\rho)$, $p_n \in G_{\rho_n}(s_n)$, and $p_n \to p$, then taking limits in $F_{\rho_n}(s_n,p_n) \geq F_{\rho_n}(s_n,q)$ for all $q \in P$ yields $p \in G_\rho(s)$.

Step 1 (Monotonicity). For $p \geq 0$, $u(\cdot,p)$ and $\phi_\rho(\cdot,p)$ are nondecreasing in s. Hence B_ρ maps the closed set of nondecreasing functions in $C(S)$ into itself, and W_ρ is nondecreasing.

Step 2 (Dynamic prices are weakly below myopic prices). Let $\bar{p}^m(s)$ denote the largest maximizer of $u(s,\cdot)$ on P. If $p > \bar{p}^m(s)$, then $u(s,p) < u(s,\bar{p}^m(s))$. Moreover, since x_j is nonincreasing in p, $\phi_\rho(s,p) \leq \phi_\rho(s,\bar{p}^m(s))$, so Step 1 gives $W_\rho(\phi_\rho(s,p)) \leq W_\rho(\phi_\rho(s,\bar{p}^m(s)))$. Hence $p \leq \bar{p}^m(s)$ for all $p \in G_\rho(s)$.

Step 3 (Static solution). Fix s with $a := V_E(s_E) > 0$ and $b := V_F(s_F) \leq a$, and let $f(p) = p\,[\max\{0, a-p\} + \max\{0, b-p\}]$. If $b \leq 0$, then $x_F = 0$ on P, and the unique maximizer

of f is $a/2$. Let $b > 0$. On $\{p \geq b\}$, the maximum of f is $a^2/4$, attained at $a/2$, if $b \leq a/2$; and it is $b(a-b)$, attained at b, if $b > a/2$. On $\{p < b\}$, $f(p) = p(a+b-2p)$. If $b > a/3$, its maximum there is $(a+b)^2/8$, attained at $(a+b)/4 < b$. If $b \leq a/3$, f is increasing on $\{p < b\}$ with supremum $b(a-b) < a^2/4$. Comparing the regions: for $a/3 < b \leq a/2$, $(a+b)^2/8 \gtrless a^2/4$ if and only if $b \gtrless (\sqrt{2}-1)a$; for $b > a/2$, $(a+b)^2/8 - b(a-b) = (a-3b)^2/8 > 0$. Since $1/3 < \sqrt{2}-1 < 1/2$, it follows that: (i) every maximizer of f lies weakly below $a/2$; and (ii) the unique maximizer is $a/2$ if $b < (\sqrt{2}-1)a$, and $(a+b)/4 < b$ if $b > (\sqrt{2}-1)a$. By (i) and Step 2, $x_E(s_E, p) \geq V_E(s_E)/2$ for all $p \in G_\rho(s)$.

Step 4 (Reaching $s_E = 1$). Let $\rho_F \leq v_E\rho_E/v_F$. Suppose $V_F(s_{F,t}) \leq V_E(s_{E,t})$. Then $\bar{x}_{F,t} \leq \bar{x}_{E,t}$ at any common price. Hence either $s_{E,t+1} = 1$, in which case $V_E(s_{E,t+1}) = r \geq V_F(s_{F,t+1})$; or $V_E(s_{E,t+1}) - V_E(s_{E,t}) = v_E\rho_E\bar{x}_{E,t} \geq v_F\rho_F\bar{x}_{F,t} \geq V_F(s_{F,t+1}) - V_F(s_{F,t})$. Since $V_F(s_{F,0}) < V_E(s_{E,0})$, induction shows that the ordering holds along every optimal path. Because $V_E(s_{E,t}) \geq V_E(s_{E,0})$, Step 3 gives $\bar{x}_{E,t} \geq V_E(s_{E,0})/2 =: \underline{x} > 0$. Hence $s_{E,t} \geq \min\{1,\, s_{E,0} + t\rho_E\underline{x}\}$, so $s_{E,\tau} = 1$ for some $\tau \leq N := \lceil (1-s_{E,0})/(\rho_E\underline{x}) \rceil$. Note that N does not depend on ρ_F. Since $\bar{x}_{F,t} \leq r < 1$, we also have $s_{F,\tau} \leq s_{F,0} + \rho_F N$.

Step 5 (Uniform absorption). Since V_F is continuous and strictly increasing with $V_F(1) = r > (\sqrt{2}-1)r > V_F(s_{F,0})$, there is a unique $\bar{s} \in (s_{F,0}, 1)$ with $V_F(\bar{s}) = (\sqrt{2}-1)r$. Fix $\varepsilon > 0$ with $s_{F,0} + \varepsilon < \bar{s}$ and let $K = [s_{F,0},\, s_{F,0} + \varepsilon]$. We claim that there is $\bar{\rho} > 0$ such that, for all $\rho_F \in [0, \bar{\rho})$ and $s \in K$, every $p \in G_\rho(1, s)$ satisfies $p \geq V_F(s)$. Suppose not. Then there exist $\rho_{F,n} \to 0$, $s_n \in K$, and $p_n \in G_{(\rho_E, \rho_{F,n})}(1, s_n)$ with $p_n < V_F(s_n)$. Passing to a subsequence, $s_n \to s^* \in K$ and $p_n \to p^* \leq V_F(s^*)$. By the closed-graph property in Step 0, $p^* \in G_{(\rho_E,0)}(1, s^*)$. If $\rho_F = 0$, the state $(1, s^*)$ is unchanged under any price, so $G_{(\rho_E,0)}(1, s^*) = \arg\max_p u((1, s^*), p) = \{r/2\}$ by Step 3(ii), because $V_F(s^*) < (\sqrt{2}-1)r$. But $r/2 > (\sqrt{2}-1)r > V_F(s^*) \geq p^*$, a contradiction.

Now let $\rho_F < \bar{\rho}$ and $s \in K$. Every element of $G_\rho(1, s)$ lies in $E := \{p \in P : p \geq V_F(s)\}$. On E, $x_F = 0$ and $\phi_\rho((1, s), p) = (1, s)$, so $F_\rho((1, s), p) = \frac{1}{2}p(r-p) + \beta W_\rho(1, s)$. This function is strictly concave in p, and its unique maximizer $r/2$ lies in E because $V_F(s) < (\sqrt{2}-1)r < r/2$. Since every element of $G_\rho(1, s)$ maximizes $F_\rho((1, s), \cdot)$ over $P \supseteq E$ and lies in E, it follows that $G_\rho(1, s) = \{r/2\}$, and $(1, s)$ is absorbing.

Step 6 (Conclusion). Let $\bar{\rho}_F = \min\{\bar{\rho},\, \varepsilon/\max\{N, 1\},\, v_E\rho_E/v_F\}$ and $\rho_F \in (0, \bar{\rho}_F)$. Along any optimal path, Step 4 yields $\tau \leq N$ with $s_{E,\tau} = 1$ and $s_{F,\tau} \in [s_{F,0},\, s_{F,0} + \rho_F N] \subset K$. By Step 5, the unique optimal price at $(1, s_{F,\tau})$ is $p^*_\tau = r/2$, $\bar{x}_{F,\tau} = 0$, and the state is unchanged. By induction, the same holds for all $t \geq T^* := \tau$.

Finally, suppose $V_F(s_{F,0}) > (\sqrt{2}-1)V_E(s_{E,0})$. By Step 3(ii), the unique static maximizer at s_0 is $(V_E(s_{E,0}) + V_F(s_{F,0}))/4 < V_F(s_{F,0})$. By Step 2, every $p \in G_\rho(s_0)$ satisfies $p < V_F(s_{F,0})$, so $\bar{x}_{F,0} > 0$ along every optimal path. ■

Proof of Proposition 8: Let $a := V_E(s_{E,0})$. The condition implies $a > (1+\sqrt{2}/2)\, v_F\lambda_F > 0$ and $V_F(s_{F,0}) < (\sqrt{2}-1)a$. The law of motion is

$$\phi_{\rho_E}(s,p) = \big(\min\{1, s_E + \rho_E x_E(s_E,p)\},\ \min\{1, s_F + \lambda_F\}\big).$$

It is continuous in (s,p,ρ_E), nondecreasing in s, and nonincreasing in p, and it satisfies $\|\phi_{\rho_E} - \phi_{\rho'_E}\| \le |\rho_E - \rho'_E|$. Hence Steps 0–2 of the proof of Proposition 7 apply verbatim with $\rho = \rho_E$: the value function W_{ρ_E} exists and is nondecreasing, G_{ρ_E} has a closed graph in (s,ρ_E), and every $p \in G_{\rho_E}(s)$ lies weakly below the largest static maximizer at s.

Step 1 (Static facts). For $A \in (0,r]$ and $B \le r$, let $M(A,B)$ be the set of maximizers of $f(p) = p\,[\max\{0, A-p\} + \max\{0, B-p\}]$ on P. By Step 3 of the proof of Proposition 7: (i) $M = \{A/2\}$, with $A/2 > B$, if $B < (\sqrt{2}-1)A$; (ii) $M = \{A/2, (A+B)/4\}$ if $B = (\sqrt{2}-1)A$; (iii) $M = \{(A+B)/4\}$, with $(A+B)/4 < B$, if $(\sqrt{2}-1)A < B < A$. Moreover, (iv) if $B > (\sqrt{2}-1)A$, then $\max M < B$. For $B < A$, this is (iii). For $B \ge A$, f vanishes on $[B,r]$ while $f(A/2) > 0$.

Step 2 (Benchmark). Since $\rho_F = 0$, frontier-task capabilities follow the exogenous path $\sigma_t = \min\{1, s_{F,0} + t\lambda_F\}$ along every path, for every ρ_E. Let $b_t := V_F(\sigma_t)$. Then b_t is nondecreasing, $b_t - b_{t-1} \le v_F\lambda_F$, and $b_t = r$ for $t \ge T_1 := \lceil (1 - s_{F,0})/\lambda_F \rceil$, where $T_1 \ge 1$ because $b_0 < (\sqrt{2}-1)a < r$. Since $b_{T_1} = r > (\sqrt{2}-1)a$, there is a first date $t_0 \in \{1,\dots,T_1\}$ with $b_{t_0} \ge (\sqrt{2}-1)a$. Since $b_{t_0-1} < (\sqrt{2}-1)a$ and $v_F\lambda_F < (2-\sqrt{2})a$, we have $b_{t_0} < a$. Let $t_1 := t_0$ if $b_{t_0} > (\sqrt{2}-1)a$, and $t_1 := t_0 + 1$ otherwise. In the latter case, $\sigma_{t_0} < 1$, so $t_1 \le T_1$ and $(\sqrt{2}-1)a < b_{t_1} \le b_{t_0} + v_F\lambda_F < a$. Thus $b_{t_1} \in ((\sqrt{2}-1)a,\, a)$ in both cases.

For $t \le T_1$, let $M_t := M(a, b_t)$. If $\rho_E = 0$, then $s_{E,t} = s_{E,0}$ and the continuation value does not depend on the price, so $G_0(s_{E,0}, \sigma_t) = M_t$. By Step 1, $b_t \notin M_t$ for every $t \le T_1$, so $\eta := \min_{t \le T_1} \operatorname{dist}(b_t, M_t) > 0$. Let $\gamma := (a - b_{t_1})/4 > 0$.

Step 3 (Uniform approximation). We claim that for every $\delta > 0$ there is $\bar\rho(\delta) > 0$ such that, for all $\rho_E \in (0, \bar\rho(\delta))$ and along every optimal path, $\operatorname{dist}(p_t, M_t) < \delta$ for all $t \le T_1$. Since $x_E \le r < 1$, we have $0 \le s_{E,t} - s_{E,0} \le \rho_E T_1$ for $t \le T_1$. Suppose the claim fails. Then there are $\rho_{E,n} \to 0$, optimal paths, and a date $\hat t \le T_1$ (constant after passing to a subsequence) with $p^n_{\hat t} \in G_{\rho_{E,n}}(s^n_{E,\hat t}, \sigma_{\hat t})$ and $\operatorname{dist}(p^n_{\hat t}, M_{\hat t}) \ge \delta$. Along a further subsequence, $p^n_{\hat t} \to p^*$. Since $s^n_{E,\hat t} \to s_{E,0}$, the closed-graph property gives $p^* \in G_0(s_{E,0}, \sigma_{\hat t}) = M_{\hat t}$, a contradiction.

Step 4 (Regime switch and jump). Let $\delta := \min\{\eta, \gamma\}/3$ and $\bar\rho_E := \min\{\bar\rho(\delta),\, \gamma/(3v_E T_1)\}$. Fix $\rho_E \in (0, \bar\rho_E)$ and an optimal path. For $t \le T_1$, p_t lies within $\delta < \eta$ of some $m \in M_t$ with $|m - b_t| \ge \eta$, so $\bar x_{F,t} > 0$ if and only if $m < b_t$. By Step 1, $M_t = \{a/2\}$ with $a/2 > b_t$ for $t < t_0$, and $M_t \subset [0, b_t)$ for $t_1 \le t \le T_1$, by (iv), because $b_t \ge b_{t_1} > (\sqrt{2}-1)a$. Hence $\bar x_{F,t} = 0$

for $t < t_0$, and $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ for $t_1 \leq t \leq T_1$. For $t > T_1$, we have $b_t = r > (\sqrt{2}-1)V_E(s_{E,t})$, so by Step 1(iv) and Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 7, every optimal price lies below r and $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$. Thus $T_s := \min\{t : \bar{x}_{F,t} > 0\} \in \{t_0, t_1\}$, $T_s \geq 1$, and $\bar{x}_{F,t} > 0$ for all $t \geq T_s$.

Because $\bar{x}_{F,T_s-1} = 0$, p_{T_s-1} lies within δ of $a/2$, the only element of M_{T_s-1} above b_{T_s-1}. Because $\bar{x}_{F,T_s} > 0$ and $b_{T_s} \in [(\sqrt{2}-1)a,\, b_{t_1}]$, p_{T_s} lies within δ of $(a+b_{T_s})/4$, the only element of M_{T_s} below b_{T_s} by Step 1(ii)–(iii). Using $a \leq V_E(s_{E,t}) \leq a + v_E\rho_E T_1$ for $t \leq T_1$,

$$\bar{x}_{E,T_s} - \bar{x}_{E,T_s-1} \;\geq\; \left[a - \tfrac{a+b_{T_s}}{4} - \delta\right] - \left[a + v_E\rho_E T_1 - \tfrac{a}{2} + \delta\right] \;\geq\; \gamma - 2\delta - v_E\rho_E T_1 \;>\; 0.$$

Step 5 (Flatness). Given $\varepsilon > 0$, let $\delta' := \min\{\eta, \gamma, \varepsilon\}/3$ and $\hat{\rho}_E := \min\{\bar{\rho}(\delta'),\, \min\{\gamma, \varepsilon\}/(3v_E T_1)\}$. Step 4 applies for $\rho_E < \hat{\rho}_E$. For $t < T_s$, we have $\bar{x}_{F,t} = 0$, so p_t lies within δ' of $a/2$. Therefore $|\bar{x}_{E,t} - a/2| \leq |V_E(s_{E,t}) - a| + |p_t - a/2| < \varepsilon/3 + \varepsilon/3 < \varepsilon$. ■

Proof of Proposition 9: Let p_t^0 denote the unconstrained equilibrium price and p_t^K the equilibrium price under the constraint. For any p, let $\bar{x}_{j,t}(p) = \min\left\{\max\left\{V_{j,t} - p, 0\right\}, 1\right\}$, and let $X_t(p)$ denote aggregate AI demand. Since $X_t(p)$ is weakly decreasing in p, if the unconstrained allocation is infeasible, every feasible price satisfies $p_t^K > p_t^0$.

Suppose first that the unconstrained equilibrium excludes frontier tasks. Then $p_t^0 \geq V_{F,t}$, and hence $p_t^K \geq p_t^0 \geq V_{F,t}$. It follows that $\bar{x}_{F,t}^K = 0$.

Now suppose that the unconstrained equilibrium partially automates both task types. If $p_t^K \geq V_{F,t}$, then $\bar{x}_{F,t}^K = 0$. Otherwise, both task types remain partially automated, and

$$\frac{\bar{x}_{E,t}(p)}{\bar{x}_{F,t}(p)} = \frac{V_{E,t} - p}{V_{F,t} - p}. \tag{C.19}$$

Moreover,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial p}\left(\frac{V_{E,t} - p}{V_{F,t} - p}\right) = \frac{V_{E,t} - V_{F,t}}{(V_{F,t} - p)^2} > 0. \tag{C.20}$$

Therefore, $p_t^K > p_t^0$ implies $\frac{\bar{x}_{E,t}^K}{\bar{x}_{F,t}^K} > \frac{\bar{x}_{E,t}^0}{\bar{x}_{F,t}^0}$. ■